

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MARCH, 1970

AFRICA, 1970

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Current History

MARCH, 1970

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In this issue seven authors discuss events in Africa. Our first article notes: "That the Rhodesian independence declaration was illegal is certainly true, but not overwhelmingly important; declarations of independence usually are. . . . Rhodesian independence, after four years, is now a fact of international life, though it can hardly be called an accepted fact."

Independent Rhodesia

BY ARTHUR CAMPBELL TURNER

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside

PROBABLY MOST PEOPLE think of Rhodesia as an aberrant British colony. In a vague fashion, this notion is correct. As soon as one begins to consider specific points, however, a sharply different picture emerges. The truth about Rhodesia is that Rhodesia has never been, in the normal sense, a British colony. At no time has the government of the United Kingdom exercised direct authority there, and it is almost half a century since the British government exercised any authority there. The end of nominal British authority in 1965 was no innovation. It merely brought theory and reality closer together.

The present situation in Rhodesia is the outcome of a course of development which is without any precise parallel, even among the remarkable variety of constitutional relationships in the territories over which Britain once held sway. The development of Rhodesia was unique, as is her present situation.

Rhodesia was essentially the creation of that great, flawed genius, Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902). Rhodes' dream was a southern Africa united under British rule, but he was the most independent of men with little liking for British control. He was also far

from being an agent of the imperial government, which mistrusted projects of expansion and which usually had to be coerced or bamboozled into going along with Rhodes' plans. The instrument of expansion was the chartered company founded by Rhodes—the British South Africa Company. Such a device had been known in earlier imperial history. The greatest example of the kind was the East India Company, founded in 1600, which ruled India until the 1850's. But India, of course, was never an area which British people settled and made their permanent home.

In 1889, Rhodes, striding north from the Cape past the Dutch Transvaal, obtained from Lobengula, King of the Matabele, mineral and settlement rights over a vast ill-defined realm beyond the Limpopo and the Zambesi and west of Portuguese Mozambique. The area had no European settlers, yet its high altitude gave it an attractive climate. By today's standards Rhodes' proceedings were doubtless deplorable. Yet Dame Margery Perham makes a relevant point:

We must not forget that by the nineties the alternative for the tribes was not some sub-tropical Arcadia, not even the old freedom, that of the

militant Matabele to ravage their neighbors and of the Mashona to be ravaged. The alternative to Rhodes' take-over was the ungoverned exploitation of freebooters or the alternative yoke of Boers, Portuguese or Germans.¹

Once the deal with Lobengula was completed, Rhodes obtained a Royal Charter that established his company as the organizing authority for the area, and in effect a government on its own. The company, not the British government, paid for the administration of the territory. The civil service of Rhodesia was neither paid for, organized nor controlled by the British government. This set it apart from such areas as Kenya, which were administered by the British colonial service.

The pioneering settlers who answered Rhodes' call, starting in 1890, were in effect *voortrekkers*, out-trekking the Boers who had gone north from the Cape in a search for independence to settle the Transvaal 60 years earlier. The Rhodesians, like the Boers, were intensely self-reliant and independent, in spirit very like the pioneers of the American West. Just as in the American West, the settlements cost lives. More than 100 whites were murdered on their new holdings in the Matabele wars before the area settled down to the peaceful condition which in general has characterized it to the present day.

Rhodesia was, of course, nominally under British sovereignty, but Britain's practical control was minimal. A representative of the British High Commissioner in Cape Province took up residence. In 1911, Northern Rhodesia, the area north of the Zambesi, larger in area than the south but with few European settlers, was separated from Southern Rhodesia, the area between the Limpopo and the Zambesi.

Representative institutions began in 1898 with the creation of a Legislative Council. At first the official (nominated) members were in a majority, but this gradually changed. The electoral basis assured white control by means of income and property re-

quirements, but there was no test based on race. In this the political arrangements reflected, as they still do, the paternalistic racial views of Rhodes, based on a conception of white superiority over native races regarded as being in a state of tutelage: a concept, however, that was prepared to allow the native races to share power, provided it was done gradually, and that fitness for a share in power had been demonstrated.

CONTROL PASSES TO SALISBURY

As the company's Charter was due to lapse in 1924, some sort of decision was necessary shortly after World War I. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (where the Company had also been active) were to continue under more or less normal colonial institutions, but Britain gave the settlers of Southern Rhodesia the choice of joining the adjacent, substantially independent Union of South Africa (created in 1910) as a fifth province, or of achieving substantial autonomy with full internal self-government. Despite the exertions of Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950), then Prime Minister of South Africa, and the preferences of the British government, the settlers remained consistent to their tradition of independence and chose the latter alternative in a referendum by 8,774 to 5,989 votes.

This, not 1965, was the moment when control passed from London to Salisbury, the Rhodesian capital. Under the constitution granted to it in 1923 by statute of the British Parliament, Rhodesia became a "self-governing colony," with a status just short of that enjoyed by the Dominions such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It was sometimes referred to by lawyers as a "quasi-Dominion." British authority was virtually nonexistent in internal affairs. The British government had reserved the possibility of vetoing bills adversely affecting native interests, but this veto was never used, and therefore might be regarded as a right that had lapsed through desuetude. Two occasions that might have called for the exercise of a veto were the passing of the Lands Apportionment Acts of 1936 and 1941, which allotted some 75,000 square miles—mostly of

¹ Margery Perham, D.C.M.G., "The Rhodesian Crisis: The Background," *International Affairs*, January, 1966, pp. 1-2.

better land—to Europeans and 50,000 square miles to the Africans who constituted an overwhelming majority.

The Rhodesians were in control of their own police, army and civil service. The British-appointed Governor was purely a figurehead. Relations with London were conducted through the Dominions Office, not the Colonial Office. From 1933 on, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia attended Imperial Conferences (later called Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences), at which all the other members were Prime Ministers of Dominions. Though Rhodesia did not possess "international personality" and was not a member of the League or of the United Nations (though non-self-governing India was), she issued her own passports, had control of her own commerce and established consulates abroad. On the eve of World War II, Dominion status seemed to be only a short step ahead. Certainly British policy in that period could hardly be said to exist, largely because Rhodesia provided no military bases and created no problems for the imperial government. Rhodesia's white population was intensely loyal to the Crown and Dominion status was its highest political ambition. The native population was quiescent.

Probably only the small size of the white settler population kept Britain from yielding to Southern Rhodesia the cherished goal of Dominion status on a par with Canada and the others. The white population in 1936 was only 55,000, but it quadrupled in the next 30 years. Many of the immigrants of the postwar years were consciously seeking—and they found—a way of life no longer to be had in the Crippsian austerity of the British "welfare state," with its high taxation, egalitarianism and general air of departed greatness. They were not refugee aristocrats; on the

contrary, the great majority were lower-middle class people who in Rhodesia might reasonably hope sooner or later to enjoy a standard of living they might never have enjoyed at home, with cars, swimming pools and colored servants.

FEDERATION AND AFTER

The shape which the Rhodesian question took in the 1960's was the result of the curious experiment of "federation" and its breakdown. The idea of uniting Southern with Northern Rhodesia and possibly Nyasaland (or of reuniting, for all had been in the area of activity of the British South Africa Company) was not entirely new. It had been examined in 1939 by the Bledisloe Commission, which had recommended against it.² But the development of the copper industry in Northern Rhodesia made it seem even more desirable to Southern Rhodesian leaders, while the small white community in the north thought its position would be stronger in a union. Thus was born the idea of a great new white-dominated Dominion in central Africa. For the last century or so the British government has had a weakness for adopting federal solutions in distant places, while maintaining a rigidly unitary constitution in the United Kingdom.³ It accepted the idea of federation without much reluctance, and in the face of a good deal of expert advice. In 1953, the Central African Federation came into being.

The federation—really something of a misnomer—comprised Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The two latter units still had colonial status, with London exercising a large role in their affairs. The federation was a stool with three legs of different lengths. In 1960 and 1961, when many colonies in Africa were becoming independent, native opposition in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the federation became so active as to persuade the British government that it must be dissolved. Nyasaland was allowed to secede on December 19, 1962, and Northern Rhodesia on March 29, 1963. Both shortly became independent states under majority (i.e., black) rule, North-

² *Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5949 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1939).

³ The United Kingdom government has provided federal constitutions for, among others, Canada, Australia, India and Malaysia. In 1958, it created a West Indian federation which went the way of the Central African federation.

ern Rhodesia as "Zambia" on October 24,⁴ and Nyasaland as "Malawi" on July 6, 1964. The federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, and most Southern Rhodesians regarded Britain's permission for the break-up of the federation as a betrayal which involved bad faith and broken promises on the part of the United Kingdom government.⁵ This colored their attitudes toward British governments, both Conservative and Labour, in the coming years. So also did the appalling scenes of terror in the Congo—not very far from Rhodesia—during these years, after Belgium had hurriedly given independence to that colony in 1960.

U.D.I.

Meanwhile the British government, with appropriate consultation with the Rhodesians, had devised a new constitution in 1961, and enacted it for Rhodesia. The constitution, too complex to explain in detail here, marked a modest advance in its regard for native interests. Africans would return 15 of the 65 seats in the Rhodesian parliament. The new constitution had been envisaged in Rhodesia as a penultimate step to Dominion status. But certain of its provisions, particularly in regard to the amending process, showed that Britain retained the whip hand.

Worse still (from the Rhodesian point of view), the British government was showing an unprecedented interest in Rhodesian native policy, pressuring the Salisbury government to admit blacks quickly to political power. And London was also showing an increasing disposition to make the status of Rhodesia a subject to be discussed by the whole Commonwealth. As many new Commonwealth members were non-white states, self-governing for a matter only of months or a few years—whereas Rhodesia had been self-governing for more than 40 years—the Rhodesians, already irked by what they regarded as British bad faith, were incensed. This was clearly seen in internal political developments

in Rhodesia, where in March, 1962, a right-wing group seceded from the ruling United Federal party to unite with the pre-existing Dominion party to form the Rhodesian Front. The Rhodesian Front won a general election in December, 1962, under the leadership of Winston Field. He was succeeded as Prime Minister in 1964 by Ian Smith, who won another election decisively in 1965. Smith, though the subject of regular denunciation in the most respected forums, is a singularly straightforward person of complete personal integrity.

Relations between Britain and Rhodesia worsened in 1964 when the Conservative government—presided over by Harold Macmillan and then more briefly by Sir Alex Douglas-Home—was succeeded (October 15) by Harold Wilson's Labour government, which was bitterly opposed to the squirearchical traditions of Rhodesia. From the beginning, Wilson seemed almost to court a crisis with Rhodesia, warning as early as October 27 that "a unilateral declaration of independence would be an open act of defiance and rebellion." On November 5, in Rhodesia, a referendum was held which showed that 90 per cent of those voting were in favor of independence under the 1961 constitution. However, only 60 per cent of the registered voters actually voted. A little more than a year of fruitless negotiation followed before the issuance of the Rhodesian Declaration of Independence of November 11, 1965, which borrowed many phrases from the more famous American document of July 4, 1776.

That the Rhodesian independence declaration was illegal is certainly true, but not overwhelmingly important; declarations of independence usually are. At any rate, the significance of the illegality diminishes with time. Rhodesian independence, after four years, is now a fact of international life, though it can hardly be called an accepted fact.

An evaluation of Rhodesia's situation since 1965 cannot, in the nature of the case, be a discussion of Rhodesian events alone. There are four topics, or interconnected streams of events, which can be discerned and which are

⁴ Shortly thereafter Southern Rhodesia became simply Rhodesia.

⁵ See Welensky's memoirs, *Four Thousand Days* (London: Collins, 1964), *passim*.

best discussed separately for purposes of clarity. One is domestic politics in Rhodesia. Another is the attempts at settlement between Rhodesia and its nominal sovereign, the United Kingdom. A third topic is the role that the United Nations has played, and the attempts to effect results in Rhodesia by an international policy of sanctions. The fourth is the actual results of those efforts in Rhodesia.

RHODESIAN POLITICS SINCE U.D.I.

The country which Ian Smith has governed as Prime Minister since 1964, and in independence since November, 1965, is still small in population—especially the size of the predominant group—but not particularly so in area. Its area is 150,333 square miles—about three-quarters the size of France, or about the area of California. The population comprises about 4,105,000 blacks, 224,000 whites, and 21,000 of other ethnic groups.

Despite the fact that Rhodesian whites are outnumbered by about 20 to 1, the confident prophecies that Premier Smith would soon run into insuperable internal difficulties have proved as wide of the mark as all other prophecies of Rhodesian doom. The natives have not risen in rebellion.⁶ They have not encouraged so-called “liberation” from neighboring territories. There has been some internal discontent. Smith has been under pressure from various directions, but very little pressure has come from non-whites. Pressure has come from whites who wish to make a settlement with Britain even at the price of surrender; more pressure has come from whites who think Smith’s policy is not sufficiently obdurate.

Since Rhodesia is a country under siege, it is natural that the government has strengthened itself by taking additional emergency powers. The Rights Amendment Act of 1965 was one example of this. There is some degree of newspaper censorship, though prob-

ably not so stringent as the control which the British government has exercised over the B.B.C. in its discussions of the Rhodesian case. There were some student disorders at University College, Rhodesia, in 1966, which resulted in the temporary closure of the institution. By the more exalted standards of disorder at Berkeley, Columbia, Paris or Tokyo, these were trivial. The hand of the Rhodesian government was strengthened by the Rhodesian High Court decision of September, 1966, which held that the Smith administration was the only government capable of upholding law and order.

At the Rhodesian Front party congress in September, 1967, minority right-wing elements failed to gain support for resolutions in favor of declaring a republic and increasing racial segregation. Smith gained an overwhelming vote of confidence for his moderate, slow approach to necessary changes. A long-term concern for the economic future was seen in the commissioning by the Rhodesian government in 1967 of an economic study by Dr. J. L. Sadie of Stellenbosch University in South Africa. The report advocated an increasing orientation of Rhodesian trade toward South Africa and increased white immigration. Two new political groups in opposition to the Rhodesian Front appeared in 1968. Neither was very strong, and they balanced each other. On one side, the Rhodesian National party, headed by Len Idensohn, was pledged to a more vigorous maintenance of white rule. On the other side, the Centre party which merged with the older Constitutional Association called for accommodation with Britain.

There was much external criticism of the execution of five Africans in March, 1968. The criticism turned on the fact that they had been “reprieved” by Queen Elizabeth; a singularly futile gesture on Wilson’s part since the Queen’s writ had ceased to run in Rhodesia some time before. The criticisms failed to take account of the fact that the condemned had been found guilty, after careful, regular trials, of several premeditated and singularly brutal murders.

It was inevitable that circumstances would

⁶ Nomenclature of groups in Africa always provides problems. The term “native” is used here in the conventional sense to mean “non-white native.” Most Rhodesian whites are natives in the sense that they were born in Africa. No usage entirely escapes being unsatisfactory.

increasingly press the Rhodesian Front into a more extreme position, including a racial policy closer to South African apartheid than to Rhodes' ideals. This has been the main result of British policy and international pressure; but perhaps the point most worth noting is the small degree to which it has happened.

A new green and white flag replaced the Union Jack in Rhodesia on November 11, 1968. The most important internal political development has been the approval by referendum on June 20, 1969, of a new Rhodesian constitution, the product of several years' work. The new constitution is clearly intended to prevent the swamping of the power of the white minority by the black majority for the indefinite future. There will be a House of Assembly of 66 members: 50 Europeans and 16 Africans, eight of the latter elected by tribal electoral colleges, eight by enrolled African voters. African membership in the House will gradually increase, in proportion to the rise in the total of income taxes paid by Africans. There will also be a Senate of 23 members, ten Europeans elected by European members of the House of Assembly, ten African chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, and three persons "of any race" appointed by the head of state. The former Royal Governor is replaced by a head of state appointed by the Executive Council (Cabinet). It was widely supposed that approval of the new constitution would be followed by its promulgation on November 11, 1969. This did not happen, but early in 1970 the remaining links with the colonial past and the British Crown will be cut by the new constitution, which establishes a republican nation. All indications are that Smith will hold a general election around May, 1970, and that he will win it hands down. These most recent steps cut to the vanishing point the possibility of a reconciliation with Britain on anything like the former basis.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN

It is difficult to say precisely what the British government's expectations were in November, 1965, when Rhodesia declared her independence. Whatever they were, they

were grotesquely ill-founded. The preliminary barrage of hostile actions by Britain in that month had effect only when the action was immediately within British physical power (the expulsion of the Rhodesian High Commissioner from London, for example). But such measures as prohibiting members of the Rhodesian police, armed forces and civil service from upholding the new regime were absolutely without effect.

Other measures—expulsion of Rhodesia from the sterling area and other financial and economic measures—were presumably intended to have a long-term effect. Yet the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held at Lagos, Nigeria, January 11–12, 1966, solemnly issued the following pronouncement:

In this connection the Prime Ministers noted the statement by the British Prime Minister that on the expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.

Several African members of the Commonwealth attempted to pressure Wilson to use force in Rhodesia but from the beginning he eschewed this, probably because it would have been a matter of some difficulty. Rhodesia has no seacoast. She is surrounded to east, west and south by South African or Portuguese territory. Any assault would have had to be conducted by air and from a base enormously distant. Moreover, Rhodesia has her own armed forces which, though small, remained loyal to the regime in Salisbury. To send British forces to fight them in a fratricidal conflict would have been a horrifying undertaking; a public opinion poll indicated that the British public was opposed to doing so by a majority of sixteen to one.

(Continued on page 179)

Arthur Campbell Turner has taught at the University of Glasgow and at Toronto University. He has served as chairman of the editorial committee of the University of California Press. The most recent of his many books is (with L. Freedman) *Tension Areas in World Affairs* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1964).

"The federal Nigerian government will have to achieve new drive and dynamism if it is effectively to reintegrate the whole Ibo people. . . ." This author notes that "to those in power in the Eastern Region, the decree of May, 1967, creating the 12 states was a device for removing from their control land, oil under that land, and thus wealth. The creation of the East Central, Southeast and Rivers States out of the former Eastern Region became the immediate cause of the attempted secession of Eastern Nigeria and the creation of Biafra."

Nigeria After Biafra

BY DAVID J. MURRAY

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WITH THE SURRENDER of Biafran forces on January 12, 1970, 30 months of bitter fighting came to an end. The world's attention had been focused on Biafra's battle for survival in the face of a Nigerian army determined to obliterate it as an independent state. Yet there was more of interest in the recent history of Nigeria than what had been for Nigerians a civil war between the federal government and a relatively small group in the society.

For Nigerians, the central issue was the attempt to refashion the whole order of government and society to overcome the major problems of the past (of which the civil war was only one facet). To many Nigerians, the first Nigerian republic, which lasted from Independence in October, 1960, to the first army coup in January, 1966, suffered three overriding limitations. First, the constitutional order produced an inflexible political system. The departing British had saddled Nigeria with a federal constitution, which included three constituent regions; of these the Northern Region contained more than half the population of the country. These regions were large and powerful entities—the smallest was larger than all but six independent countries on the African continent—and they had an existence as independent governments

that predated the federal government. Party politics was based on the regions. The prime focus of attention was control over the regional machinery of government, and control over the federal government was based on interregional alliances. With only three regions (four after 1963, when the Mid-West region was carved out of the Western Region) and with the Northern Region containing more than one-half the country's population, there was little room for maneuver at the federal level. The federal government was almost inevitably controlled by an alliance of the agents of the Northern Region with another region; until 1965, the ally was the Eastern Region.

What made this inflexibility in the political system at the federal level more serious was the character of regional politics. In each of the Northern and Eastern Regions, a single party had gained control of the regional government and each ran its region on the basis of a single party authoritarian regime. In the Northern Region, the Northern Peoples' Congress (N.P.C.) was a party of the aristocracy from the Emirates and (having had power transferred to it by the departing British) used the machinery of the regional government to impose a control to which it would brook no challenge. In the Eastern

Region, the National Conference of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.) was a mass party of the Ibo-speaking majority. The party gained control over the regional government on the basis of majority electoral support and, as far as the Ibo-speaking population was concerned, it operated a relatively open political system. But for the 40 per cent of the population who were not Ibos, regional government appeared to be a system for allocating all benefits to the Ibos and using the machinery of government—regional and local government, courts and police—to repress opposition and criticism among minority peoples.

Two other circumstances exacerbated the general political situation. First, neither the Northern aristocracy nor the Eastern Ibos were satisfied with their alliance at the federal level, and each saw the other as committed to finding a way of excluding the other or establishing a firmer grip over the federal government. Second, this uneasiness was heightened by the political situation in the Western Region. There, particularly after 1962, because no party had a dominant influence, the state of politics allowed the Northern and Eastern Regional Governments to intervene in the hope of establishing a dependent ally who could be used to gain a predominant influence in the federal government. By 1964–1965, the N.P.C. government of the North and the N.C.N.C. government of the East were financing and furthering what amounted to a near civil war in the Western Region in their attempt to establish an ally in control of the regional government.¹


The third and final limitation of the first republic was the general lack of probity, honesty and public spiritedness in government at all levels. Government was perceived as an instrument for the personal advantage of individuals and their clients; there was a high degree of defalcation and dishonesty and little concern for the public interest.

¹ A general account of politics in Nigeria during the first republic is provided by F. A. O. Schwarz, Jr., *Nigeria—The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965).

Well before Nigerian independence, disquiet over the constitutional order and the conduct of government had been expressed, particularly among groups known as the minorities—those, paradoxically, who formed a non-Hausa majority in the population of the country as a whole—Fulani in the Northern Region, non-Ibo in the Eastern Region and non-Yoruba in the former Western Region. Military coups created the opportunity for change. The first army coup in January, 1966, was followed by an attempt to sweep away the federal structure and replace it with a unitary state. However well intentioned, these measures were widely interpreted as Ibo schemes to gain undisputed control over the whole country, to achieve through army action what the Ibos had failed to achieve by other means. The innovations were planned and carried out by the coterie of fellow Ibos with whom the Ibo supreme commander surrounded himself.

THE SECOND COUP

The second army coup of July, 1966, replaced this tightly knit group of Ibos with a collection of military officers, civil servants and non-officials, many of whom were drawn from the minority peoples. Thus Yakubu Gowon, the supreme commander, was an Angwa from the middle belt of Northern Nigeria, the head of the civil service was a Bini from Mid-Western Nigeria, and the Federal Executive Council contained leading opponents of the ruling parties in the former Northern and Eastern Regions. These individuals were not involved in the old rivalry between the Ibos and the northern aristocracy and they were unsympathetic to the past constitutional and political order which had allowed affairs to be conducted at the federal level and in the regions for the benefit of two restricted groups. Unlike their immediate predecessors, however, they did not see the establishment of a unitary state as the solution to Nigeria's problems. Disparities in educational, economic and social development in different areas, the size of the country, existing loyalties, and the distrust of centralized rule all militated against a unitary



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NIGERIA'S TWELVE STATES

state. Instead, in March, 1967, the federal government announced the abolition of the existing regions and their replacement by a new federal structure in which the constituent units were 12 states.

The 12-state structure was designed to overcome two of the three basic weaknesses in the first republic. It removed the problems that arose from having only three constituent regions, with one containing more than half the population of the country. With 12 states there was more opportunity for flexibility in the political system of the country.

The 12-state structure also overcame, at least in its existing form, the problems of single party authoritarian rule that had arisen in the Northern and Eastern Regions. Dur-

ing the period of military rule, party activities had been banned, but even with the return of political activity, the established parties would no longer be able to rely on the machinery of the regional governments. Conditions had been created in which parties would have to compete once more for support, instead of using coercive authority.

Beyond these two objectives, the 12-state structure was also designed to increase the strength of the federal government and thus to increase the degree of attachment to Nigeria. None of the state governments had the power or authority of the former regional governments, and even without a redistribution of legislative powers and financial resources, the federal government was more powerful than it had been in the first Nigerian

republic. Attention could be expected to shift to the federal government simply because the largest concentration of distributable resources would be found there.

Unfortunately, the federal government failed to gain the support of the Ibo-speaking people of Eastern Nigeria for its plans for a new constitutional structure. To those in power in the Eastern Region, the decree of May, 1967, creating the 12 states was a device for removing from their control land, oil under that land, and thus wealth. The creation of the East-Central, South-East and Rivers States out of the former Eastern Region became the immediate cause of the attempted secession of Eastern Nigeria and the creation of Biafra.

THE WAR BEGINS

Biafra announced her independence on May 30, 1967. For the next 30 months, the future of the Ibo-speaking people was one of the major issues in world politics, as a devastating civil war swept the region. At the beginning of the fighting in July, 1967, the Biafrans snatched the initiative and moved to the offensive. They gained control of the Mid-West State and advanced down the road towards the Nigerian capital of Lagos. But after their defeat at the Ore River in August, 1967, the Biafrans were on the defensive, disputing every inch of territory as the Nigerian army forced them back. In September and October, 1967, the Biafrans lost control of the Mid-West State and were pushed eastwards across the Niger River. In the same period they retreated from the area occupied by non-Ibo people in the northeast of the Eastern Region—Ogoja, Obudu, and Ikom—and they were then pushed back from the whole northern part of the region, including the regional capital of Enugu. Then, still in 1967, in the southwest of the region, the Biafrans were driven back from Calabar and the area to the east of the Cross River which again was peopled by non-Ibos. During the first six months of fighting they had been deprived of control of a major part of the Eastern Region.

Through 1968, the Biafran retreat continued, but more slowly. In March, 1968, the principal Ibo town—Onitsha—was lost; in the same month the federal Nigerian army succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of the Cross River. In May, 1968, the Biafrans lost their access to the sea when the important port and industrial center of Port Harcourt was captured by the Nigerians. By September, 1968, the two remaining towns of any size in Biafra—Aba and Owerri—had been lost, and with the capture by the Nigerians of Obilagu airstrip the Biafrans were left dependent for supplies and communication with the outside world on the single airstrip of Uli and in occupation only of the heartland of Ibo country. At this point, the federal Nigerian advance was slowed considerably and the only further gain made by them in 1969 was the capture in April of the temporary Biafran headquarters of Umuahia.

After April, 1969, the Biafrans were able to move tentatively to the offensive once more. In terms of direct territorial gain, the most striking advance was the recapture of Owerri which became the new Biafran headquarters. Beyond this the Biafrans extended their control over the countryside while not regaining control over any of the important towns that marked the limits of the Nigerian advance into Biafra—Onitsha, Okigwi, Umuahia, Ihot Ekpene, Aba. Beyond the area they controlled directly, the Biafrans sent out guerrilla bands to harass Nigerian supply lines, collect levies of food and other supplies from the local population, and attack oil installations in the oil-producing area of the Niger Delta.

In the air, also, Biafra was able to move on to the attack in the latter part of 1969. With the arrival of 18 planes from Sweden, and Swedish pilots, the Biafrans were able to attack federal Nigerian airfields and ground installations; later, a supply of United States aircraft increased Biafra's capacity to launch air attacks. The area was less than that of Connecticut and its sole link with the outside world was a single improvised airstrip, but in 1969 Biafrans successfully defied the attempts

of the federal Nigerian army to occupy the Ibo heartland.

RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA

Moreover, the Ibos gained some measure of recognition for Biafra as an independent sovereign state. Tanzania led the way in April, 1968, in granting formal recognition. The following month recognition of Biafra came from Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia. In March, 1969, Haiti followed these other four. Beyond this formal recognition, the Biafrans gained a wide measure of popular support for their state in countries as different as Sweden and Sierra Leone, and covert support was provided by a number of governments of which France and Portugal were the most forward.

Given the continued insecurity of her position, Biafra's objective remained straightforwardly to survive. To do this involved the preservation of a will to resist the Nigerian troops among the Biafran population and thus a willingness to go on fighting and starving for the sake of Biafra. Thus Biafra's internal public relations campaign was built around the statement that the federal Nigerian army would, if possible, exterminate the Ibos. Many reports coming out of Biafra confirmed the effectiveness of the state's public relations effort: people believed that they were struggling, not simply for Biafra, but for their very lives.

On the other hand, from the Biafran point of view, there were disquieting developments in late 1969—notably the number of Ibos who escaped from Biafra and openly accepted federal Nigerian authority in such towns as Abakaliki and Enugu. The important defection of Ibo Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former President of Nigeria and lifelong nationalist leader, was a serious setback. Azikiwe's action in denouncing the war, in denying Biafran claims that the Nigerian army aimed to exterminate the Ibos, and in switching his support to that of federal Nigeria was a blow to Biafra's attempts to maintain the appearance of solid Ibo support.

The question of maintaining military supplies depended to a large extent on France.

The war cost something in the region of £250 thousand a day and consumed large amounts of military equipment. Biafra long ago exhausted her financial reserves and had virtually no foreign exchange income beyond that coming from humanitarian organizations seeking to alleviate starvation in Biafra; she was thus dependent on external assistance. Similarly, although the Biafrans improvised some homemade armaments, they were heavily dependent on foreign suppliers. For both her finance and equipment, Biafra's greatest dependence was on France, although other governments provided assistance—Portugal, South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Haiti among them.

In addition to military confrontations, Biafra also tried measures to reduce Nigeria's capacity to continue the war. She attempted to stir up disturbances throughout Nigeria, particularly among the Yoruba-speaking people of Western Nigeria; attacks on oil installations in the Niger Delta were intended to reduce Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and thus her capacity to pay for arms; an international public relations campaign was launched to build opposition to the supply of arms to Nigeria, and thus either deny Nigeria needed military supplies or at least increase their cost. Other measures again were designed to put pressure on Nigeria to negotiate on Biafra's terms. In all this Biafra had her successes. But surprisingly, the Nigerian economy proved buoyant and there was a degree of support for the federal government over the war that went well beyond what had been expected at its start in the middle of 1967. On the other hand, to mention some of Biafra's achievements: oil production in Nigeria after reaching record heights in April, 1969, declined month by month; a number of governments prohibited the supply of arms to federal Nigeria; the British government, one of Nigeria's principal suppliers along with the Soviet Union, was under increasingly severe domestic political pressure to halt the supplies; and a number of countries and international organizations exerted pressure on Nigeria to open negotiations with Biafra in order to find a way to end the

war. Above all, Biafra succeeded in internationalizing a dispute which might easily have been placed on a par with the struggle of the Southern Sudanese against the Sudan government, the Kurds against Iraq, or the Nagas against the government of India.

BIAFRA SURRENDERS

Nonetheless, in January, 1970, Biafra's government finally capitulated to superior Nigerian military force. On January 10, General Odumego Ojukwu fled from Biafra. Brigadier Philip Effiong, the Biafran Chief of Staff, took his place as Biafra's leader, and reports circulated that Nigerian forces had captured Owerri, Biafra's provisional capital. On January 11, the Nigerians took over Biafra's last remaining link with the outside world, the airstrip at Uli. The following day, Effiong announced that Biafra had capitulated.

With General Gowan's broadcast declaring that he accepted the Biafran surrender "in good faith," the civil war was ended. For Nigeria, "a great moment of victory for unity and national reconciliation" had arrived.

Even while the war was in progress, the success of the federal Nigerian government in establishing the 12-state structure had been considerable. Outside the former Eastern Region, from May, 1967, to April 1, 1968, the regional governments were dismantled and new state governments were planned. The task was a considerable one. It involved the disposition of the assets, commitments and liabilities of the regional governments. What, for instance, was to happen to the Northern Region's University, situated in the new North Central State? What was to happen to the industrial and housing estates (in which the Western Region had invested a great deal of its resources) when these were to be located within the new Lagos State? Who was to accept responsibility for the pensions of officials who had retired from the service of the old Northern Region? These

were just three of the innumerable problems that arose in dismantling the existing regions of Nigeria.

In addition, there were many problems involved in creating new state governments. It was necessary to find roofs under which officials could work, and to staff the new governments and maintain a reasonable level of contentment without drastically increasing administrative overheads, in a situation where officials in the regional governments had been drawn unevenly from the areas of the new states. The papers and information relevant to ongoing projects in particular states had to be abstracted from regional government files. The stock of information about the particular state without which government cannot operate effectively had to be built up. Existing services had to be kept running when headquarters were in turmoil.

At the beginning of the new financial year in 1968, 9 of the 12 states started to function. They were followed by the South-East and Rivers States which faced a considerably more difficult task. Not only were they operating in areas which had been ravaged by the civil war but, in addition, they were creating government from nothing. The civil war had precluded any orderly transfer of the apparatus of government from the former Eastern Region to the new states. Because jobs in the former Eastern Region Civil Service were to a considerable extent reserved to Ibos, there were few officials available who had worked in the area. There was also popular antipathy to all aspects of the former system of government which was regarded as a device for Ibo rule over non-Ibos. This meant that established structures, notably of local government, could not be resurrected without alienating popular support for the new state governments. These two state governments faced enormous difficulties in establishing effective government. Growing popular support has eased the situation.²

Thus despite the success of the Nigerian government in defeating Biafra, the future of Nigeria's 12-state structure is still precarious. True, Biafra has ceased to exist as

² The best accounts of the creation and working of the state governments are to be found in *Administration, the Quarterly Review of the Institute of Administration, University of Ife*, April, 1968, and July, 1969.

a secessionist state, but the Ibo-speaking people have not yet been reincorporated into Nigerian society.

Even before the war ended, government officials realized that all the Ibo-speaking people would have to be reintegrated into Nigerian society. It had been widely recognized that it would be relatively easy to build up a greater commitment to the war, heighten the fervor with which it was prosecuted, and increase the effectiveness of the army in narrow military terms by playing on latent anti-Ibo feeling. But from the beginning of the fighting the government avoided publicity or any other action that might have aroused such feeling. The Biafran use of minority refugees, the forced deportation of minority peoples and the resettlement of areas in Biafra by Ibos, the atrocities against peoples in the Rivers and South East States—the federal government suppressed this information to avoid arousing anti-Ibo sentiment which would endanger the many thousands of Ibos who continued to live outside Ibo country. Such sentiment would also hamper the reintegration of the Ibo people into Nigerian society.

In addition to the Ibo problem, the government is also handicapped by reports of continuing corruption. There was substance to the stories of dishonesty, corruption, favoritism and lack of public spirit in the working of government during the first republic. But despite some limited reforms, there is a general impression that many of the practices of the past continue. Party politicians no longer make personal fortunes from office, but there is a general suspicion (in some respects substantiated) that military officers and enlisted men have enriched themselves and diverted their attention from fighting a war to other dubious and personally advantageous activities. Quite apart from corruption and dishonesty, moreover, there is a continued lack of drive, commitment and urgency in the federal government. There has been extensive unease in the state governments that the federal government gives so little attention to the problems involved in creating the new states.

With regard to the federal government's action in prosecuting the war, and the problems it created, there seemed to be a similar lack of purpose and involvement. Perhaps the single example of a very senior army staff officer who had been occupying a key post devoting himself to studying for—and successfully completing—a part-time degree in law sums up a typical attitude towards the war and the conduct of government at the federal level. While the federal government may have admirable intentions and motives, there seems to be a gulf between these aims and the will and capacity to carry them out.

It is generally recognized that if Biafra had been able to force acceptance of her claims, or even if the war had been drawn out beyond a certain point, then the rest of the country would have fragmented, with the large Yoruba-speaking population of the Western, Lagos and Kwara States taking the lead. Before the war ended, there were extensive disturbances in the Western State. Discontent among workers necessitated a federal government ban on strikes. There was a growing popular antipathy to soldiers and a general decline in the authority of governments attributable in a measure to the power-drunkenness of soldiers who frequently flouted constituted authority with impunity.

The reconstruction of Nigeria in a form designed to overcome the fundamental weaknesses of the past is an ambitious undertaking.

Even during the war, a radical reconstruction was in progress in an attempt to provide a more workable and equitable system of government and a deeper commitment to Nigeria. The country suffers most

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"The high hopes that accompanied the attainment of independence have, in Northeast Africa as in other parts of the continent, become attenuated as a result of subsequent differences." In actuality, "a gigantic political fracture zone is developing on the African continent. . . ."

Storm Clouds Over the African Horn

BY KEITH IRVINE

Associate Editor, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

PROSPECTS FOR A BETTER political climate in the Horn of Africa, which a year ago seemed bright, have dimmed once more, following the assassination on October 15, 1969, of Somali President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke. Moreover, the developing conflict between Eritreans and Ethiopians, combined with the perennial civil war in the southern Sudan, now threaten to fit into the larger context of an incipient confrontation between Muslim and non-Muslim African regimes—a confrontation stretching along a 3,000-mile political "fracture zone" that runs east-west approximately 10° north of the Equator.

Big power interests are, naturally, also involved in the Horn. Although the strategic importance of the sea lane from Asia to Europe through the Red Sea has been vastly diminished, following the blocking of the Suez Canal, the Horn of Africa still remains one of several strategic points upon which naval power in the Indian Ocean may be based. In recent years the Soviet Union has shown itself increasingly interested in establishing a naval presence east of Suez, and has developed friendly relations with the Somalis—a policy which is in accord with Soviet support for Muslim regimes elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East. The People's Republic of China, meanwhile, has also not neglected Somalia, which—together with Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania—has been one of the few out of Africa's 41 independent states to receive military aid from Peking.

The United States, for its part, has continued to maintain its traditional policy of friendship and support for Ethiopia.

The Horn and its hinterland of the Sudan together form a vast bloc of territory which is, perhaps, best described as Northeast Africa—excluding the United Arab Republic. The Sudan alone, which has a population of 14,979,000, has an area of 967,491 square miles, being one of the ten largest countries in the world. Ethiopia, with a population of 23,900,000, is 471,776 square miles in size. Somalia, with a population of merely 2,745,000, has an area of 246,155 square miles. Including the French-administered enclave of the Afars and Issas—formerly French Somaliland—which has an area of 8,378 square miles, and a population of 81,000, the total area of Northeast Africa thus defined amounts to 1,693,800 square miles, supporting a combined population of some 41,705,000 people, (representing about 14 per cent of Africa's area, and about 12 per cent of its population).

The variegated nature of the land has shaped its history. The center of the region is dominated by the massive Ethiopian Highlands (a part of the great Rift Valley mountain ranges of Eastern Africa), which have a mean height of between 7,000 and 8,000 feet. To the west, the headwaters of the Blue Nile flow down from this vast plateau to the plains of the Sudan, while to the east a steep escarpment, overlooking the Somali lowlands and the littoral of the Red Sea and


the Gulf of Aden, forms a natural frontier.

The first inhabitants of the region appear to have been Cushitic peoples (called Hamitic by some¹), who still form the greater part of the population. About 1,000 B.C., however, the Semitic peoples of the southern Arabian kingdom of Saba, or Sheba, began to cross the 20-mile-wide Straits of Bab'e'-Mandeb which separate Asia from Africa and to migrate into the Horn. By the end of the fourth century A.D., the Semitic invaders had established the kingdom of Aksum, and had extended its rule over the northern part of the Ethiopian plateau. By 1,000 A.D., Aksum had declined, and in its place had arisen a kingdom of Ethiopia, which intermittently controlled the entire plateau, as well as the Red Sea coast. In subsequent centuries considerable intermingling took place in the region among the Semites, the Cushites and the Nilotic peoples of the south. Thus today while the basic ethnic formation of the peoples of the region remains clear, the racial characteristics of all groups have become blurred.

In the Sudan, Arab-speaking Semites, Islamic by religion, predominate in the north, while Nilotic or Nilotic-Cushitic peoples, some Christian but mostly animist by faith, live to the south. In the eastern Sudan, as well as in Ethiopia, the Cushitic Beja tribes are found. The most northerly of the Cushitic peoples, the Beja are believed to be the group with the closest affinity to the ancient Egyptians. Of great antiquity, they were known to Greek and Roman writers as the "Blemmyes."

In Ethiopia, the Amharic people of Semitic origin—a majority of them monophyte Christians—are culturally and linguistically dominant. Largest of the many Cushitic groups who still form the majority,

¹ Although the term "Hamitic" was used by such authorities as the late C. G. Seligman, author of *The Races of Africa* (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1966), it has become unfashionable, due to the associations that the adjective possesses with the supposed "Curse of Ham." According to this Old Testament curse, the pro-slavery interpreters of Holy Writ averred, the children of Ham—i.e., those with black skins—were condemned to be hewers of wood and drawers of water in perpetuity.



on the other hand, are the Galla, many of them Islamic who, grouped into some 200 different tribes, live in the southern part of the country. The relatively small number of Nilotes in Ethiopia mostly live in the hot western lowlands, rather than on the plateau.

In Somalia, the Somali peoples, who although Cushitic are also partly of Arab ancestry, are Sunni Muslims, mostly of the Shafi'ite rite. On the hot and arid northern coast, where the average maximum temperature is often in the region of 108° in summer, the Somalis, who are divided into different tribes, are pastoral, nomadic and, in the interior, frequently engaged in feuds with one another. In the southern part of the country, however, which is relatively well watered, the Somali are agricultural, becoming increasingly intermixed with Galla towards the west, and with Negroid peoples towards the Equator.

The history of the entire region is one of extraordinary length and great interest. In the times of earliest record, the lower Sudan was known as Nubia, Ethiopia as the Land of Cush, and Somalia—it is believed—

as the Land of Punt. Yet, since the time when the "Land of Cush" fell under Semitic control, a major historic theme of the region has been the struggle by the Cushites of the plains to wrest possession of the bastion of the Ethiopian highlands from Semitic—i.e., Amharic—rule. Yet another major theme, often related to the first, has been the interaction between Christianity and Islam. After the conversion of King Ezana of Ethiopia to Christianity in the early part of the fourth century A.D.,² and after the spreading of Islam to northern and eastern Africa in the seventh century, a lengthy struggle between the two religions developed.

Before the time of Mohammed, Christian Ethiopian power had been established in the Yemen until it was driven out by the Persians. With the rise of Islam, Ethiopia was also cut off from the Mediterranean, subsequently entering upon a long period of isolation. In the fourteenth century, a series of wars began between Ethiopia and her Islamic neighbors that was to continue for about 250 years. These wars reached a climax with the rise of a remarkable Muslim leader, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim—called "Grañ," meaning "the left-handed"—during the reign of the Ethiopian ruler, Lebna Dengel. Helped by the timely arrival of Portuguese allies, the Ethiopian forces, in a historic battle fought near Lake Tana in Ethiopia in about 1542, killed Grañ and defeated his Muslim army, reasserting their control of their country. Christianity in Ethiopia had narrowly avoided the extermination with which it had been threatened. Before long, Ethiopian Christians and Muslims alike were to face a new threat—an invasion of Gallas from the south, which resulted in the Galla settlement of the Harar region, and along

the southern fringes of the Ethiopian highlands.

After the faint contacts made between Ethiopia and Rome in the fifteenth century and after the Portuguese interlude (which had ended with the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1632), it was not until the nineteenth century that European influence returned, in some measure, to the region.³

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY

With the construction of the Suez Canal, Anglo-French rivalry began to develop in the Red Sea area. One unexpected consequence of this external interest was a British invasion of Ethiopia in 1868—undertaken after the Emperor Theodore had imprisoned the British envoy, whom he suspected of supporting Islamic expansion. After the Ethiopian army had been defeated, Theodore committed suicide. The envoy was then released and the British withdrew. Once the Suez Canal was completed in 1869, the British established a coaling station for their India-bound shipping at Aden, while the French, for their part, opened a coaling station on the Somali coast—first at Obock, and later at Djibouti.

The Italians also began to take an interest in the area, opening a port at Assab, opposite Aden, which later formed the basis for the establishment of the Italian colony of Eritrea.⁴ By 1888, both Britain and France had established colonies in Somaliland, and the following year the Italians not only established a colony there, but also concluded the Treaty of Ucciali with Ethiopia. As interpreted by Italy, this amounted to the transformation of Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate—an interpretation rejected by the Emperor Menelik. Italy's expansion into Ethiopia was halted abruptly, however, when in 1896 the infiltrating Italian forces were overwhelmingly defeated by the Ethiopians at the Battle of Aduwa.

In the Sudan, meanwhile, where Britain had encouraged Egyptian power to develop, a reformist religious revolt broke out, directed against the abuses of Egyptian rule. Led by the Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed ibn

² This historic conversion was prompted by that of the Emperor Constantine.

³ In viewing the larger perspective one may set aside such diverting or dramatic episodes as the visits to Ethiopia of the French brothers d'Abbadie and of the Scotsman James Bruce of Kinnaird in the eighteenth century, and the adventures of Sir Richard Burton in the Harar region and Somaliland in the nineteenth century.

⁴ Eritrea was named after the Mare Erythracum of the Romans.

al-Sayyid Abdullah, the Sudanese rebels in 1884 and 1885 overwhelmed Egyptian garrisons, including the most important one at Khartoum, under the command of General Gordon (who was himself killed). Mahdist control was thus established in the Sudan until 1898, when Mahdist power was broken at the battle of Omdurman by an Anglo-Egyptian army, led by Kitchener. Subsequently, the Sudan was placed under an Anglo-Egyptian condominium which ensured an era of tranquillity and relative progress that was to last until after the Second World War.

Perhaps the most notable development of these years was the linking of the Sudan to the world economy by the stimulation of its cotton production—first by the construction of the Sannar Dam in 1925, and then, in 1929, by the building of a railroad to Port Sudan, providing the country with a commercial outlet to the Red Sea.

ETHIOPIA'S HISTORY

Meanwhile, Ethiopia, after Aduwa, remained for some years relatively unaffected by developments in the world at large. At the beginning of the First World War the Emperor Lij Yasu showed sympathy for Muslim Turkey, then allied with Germany. He was, in consequence, dethroned in 1916 by a coalition of Ethiopian notables and churchmen. The Empress Zauditu reigned in his stead, with her son, Ras Tafari, as the heir apparent. In 1930, on the death of the Empress, Ras Tafari was crowned emperor under the name of Haile Selassie.

Italian ambitions in the area were, however, reviving, with at least tacit encouragement from the British. Following a minor frontier dispute which provided Italy with a *casus belli*, the Italian army, based in Eritrea and Somalia, invaded Ethiopia in 1935, occupying the country—which was declared to be a part of Italian East Africa—in 1936. Haile Selassie fled to England, but was restored to his realm in the Second World War, after the defeat of the Italian forces in East Africa in 1941. Since the conclusion of a peace treaty in Paris in 1947,

when Italy abandoned its claim to Ethiopia, the sovereignty of the country has remained unchallenged. In 1952 Eritrea, by international agreement, became federated with Ethiopia as an autonomous unit—subsequently, in 1962, becoming a province of Ethiopia herself.

Meanwhile the Sudan was accorded independence in 1956, while British and Italian Somaliland—the latter having been placed under U.N. Trusteeship for ten years—united in 1960 to become the independent Republic of Somalia. Today, throughout Northeast Africa, only the small enclave of French Somaliland—now known as the French Territory of the Afars and Issas—still remains under European administration.

The high hopes that accompanied the attainment of independence have, in Northeast Africa as in other parts of the continent, become attenuated as a result of subsequent differences. The countries of the region, like those in other parts of the "Third World," have found themselves moving into an increasingly difficult economic position. This, in turn, has led to internal unrest that has jeopardized the stability of successive governments. The Sudan, for example, experienced a military coup d'état in 1958, followed by three attempted coups, followed by a return to civilian rule in 1964, followed by a return to military rule in 1969. Ethiopia, under Haile Selassie, has been more successful in maintaining the appearance of stability, but here too internal unrest has been endemic, the most serious manifestation being the abortive uprising that occurred in 1960 during the Emperor's absence abroad. In Somalia, with its different terrain, its smaller and more pastoral population, the same causes did not seem—until the recent coup—to have produced the same symptoms. But, in the region as a whole, the pattern has become clear. Nor does it soon seem likely to change.

Even more serious has been the steady drift towards direct conflict in the area. First, there has been increasing involvement in the Arab-Israeli struggle in the Middle East. Second, there has been protracted civil war in the Sudan, stemming from the

attempt of the southern provinces to secede. Third, there has been the growing conflict between Ethiopia on the one hand and some Somali factions and Muslim Eritreans on the other.

The Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, was too brief to have direct military consequences in the Horn of Africa, even although the Sudan declared war on Israel and sent Sudanese troops to the U.A.R. (Sudanese troops were also moved to the Ethiopian frontier for a time). Somalia, being engaged in an election campaign that summer, did not become involved, but demonstrated sympathy for the Arab cause. The long-term effects of the war, however, are considerable. There appears to be a tendency among some African Islamic governments—shared by some factions in the Sudan and Somalia—to compensate for the frustrations experienced by the Arab cause in the Middle East by adopting a more militant stance towards potential adversaries in Africa itself. Thus Soviet arms sent to the Sudan for the fight against Israel are likely to be used, instead, against the southern secessionist movement, just as arms sent to Libya—with whose new regime the Sudan and the U.A.R. recently concluded a pact of cooperation—are liable to find their way south to support the rebels against President François Tombalbaye's government in Chad.

The rising level of tension in the Middle East has also done much to heal the old rift between the Sudanese and Egyptian governments, to activate latent suspicions of Western governments, and to overcome religious reservations concerning relations with the Soviet Union. In this last connection, the fact that the Sudan has the largest Communist party in Africa has also had some effect upon the situation, even although the allegiance of Sudanese Communists is demonstrably given first to their own country, and not to Moscow.

The secessionist movement in the southern

Sudan, which has continued intermittently since 1956, reaching the proportions of a full-scale armed revolt in 1963, has deep roots, based on cultural and religious differences between the Christian or animist populations of the south and the Arab government in Khartoum. According to the Khartoum government, the original outbreak of violence in the south in 1956—which resulted in the massacre of whole cadres of badly-needed civil servants, carefully trained in the years before independence—was engineered by Belgian agencies, who were at that time fearful of the effect of the nationalism of an independent Sudan upon the internal situation in the Belgian Congo. Whether true or not, by 1963 the Sudanese dissidents were obtaining support from the Congo (Kinshasa), as well as from Sudanese refugees who had established themselves in other nearby African states, such as Uganda. Since then various efforts to resolve the conflict—among the most notable of which was a conference held in Khartoum itself in 1965—have all failed, even though the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), whose seat is located at Addis Ababa in neighboring Ethiopia, has exerted itself to achieve reconciliation.⁵

One step towards reconciliation nevertheless appears to have occurred recently when the Khartoum government apparently dropped its program of "forced Islamization" in the south—a program that had aroused the most bitter opposition. The Khartoum government, meanwhile, has proposed a settlement based upon the formula of local autonomy for the Sudan's southern provinces. The situation has developed so far, however, that only a solution upheld by the governments of East Africa and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo—all of which are acting as hosts to Sudanese refugees—would prove viable.

The southern Sudanese are themselves divided into various factions. One of these factions, the Azanya Liberation Front, is willing to accept Khartoum's promise of local autonomy, whereas another—the Nile Provisional Government, formed in March, 1969, under the leadership of Gordon Muerat

⁵ Efforts to induce the Pope to show public interest in the plight of Christians in the southern Sudan—made by Sudanese refugees in Uganda at the time of the recent visit of His Holiness to Kampala—were, at least publicly, unrewarded.

Mayen—is not, insisting upon a separate sovereign identity for the southern Sudan. Yet another faction, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government, which is supported by the *Anyanya*, the military wing of the secessionist movement, also insists upon a separate national identity.

Such confusion within the Sudan is harmful in several ways. First, it diverts to military ends economic resources that are desperately needed for national policies that would promote health, education and commercial development, and so help restore stability and prosperity. Second, it creates a small cyclone of violence that grows by what it feeds on, threatening to draw neighboring states into its vortex, and eventually to merge with that other cyclone already blowing up a storm in the Middle East. Third, it invites states from outside the region to risk pursuing their interests in the area by adventurous means, thus, in turn, tempting others to resort to adventurism, at the expense of the civilian populations of Northeast Africa. Cool heads are needed to help to compose a scenario for the future which does not bear any resemblance to the events that generated their own momentum in Southeast Asia.

SUDANESE-ETHIOPIAN CONFLICT

Apart from the century-long tradition of conflict between Amharic Christians and Somali Muslims, friction between the two peoples, usually over minor details such as wells or grazing rights in the Haud or Ogaden regions of Ethiopia, has persistently occurred. It was a trivial dispute over a well at Walwal in this area that provided Mussolini with the excuse that he required to attack Ethiopia in 1935. Nomadic Somalis, crossing the frontier with their herds in a seasonal rhythm, constantly find themselves at odds with Ethiopian officials. When the Republic of Somalia gained its independence in 1960,

the entire machinery of the United Nations could not succeed in persuading the Ethiopians and Somalis to agree upon the exact frontiers of the new-born state. In addition to this, most Somalis cherish the dream of a "Greater Somalia," a state that would add to the present Somali Republic at least a part of the Haud and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia, and also the Somali-frequented district of northern Kenya, and the French enclave of the Afars and Issas.

By early 1969, fortunately, the Somali administration of President Shermarke had arrived at a *modus vivendi* not only with the government of Kenya, but also with Ethiopia. Prospects for friendly coexistence in the Horn of Africa, it seemed, had markedly improved. The assassination of President Shermarke in October, 1969, followed by a military coup d'état in Somalia a week later, placed all this once more in question, at least as far as Ethiopia was concerned.

Meanwhile, the situation has deteriorated in what is now the Ethiopian province of Eritrea, where Muslim guerrillas—deriving their strength from the Muslim population (which numbers about half of the total)—have been opposing Ethiopian rule. The dissidents have been receiving financial support from oil-producing Arab states in the Middle East as well as military support from Syria, which has provided 60 officers for the Eritrean guerrillas, as well as assistance in obtaining arms from China and from East Europe. The new government in the Sudan has also been permitting the Eritrean Liberation Front⁶ (as the guerrilla movement is called), to use Kassala in the Sudan as a base. All the elements that might contribute to an expansion of the conflict—religious and cultural difficulties, historic enmities, great power rivalries—are now at hand. Only

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⁶ As Western newspapers have reported, the Eritrean Liberation Front has made several attempts, not all successful, to hijack Ethiopian airplanes. In view of its unusual geographic configuration, Ethiopia relies heavily upon aircraft for transportation.

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Landlocked Zambia's policy of disengagement from the South "has raised many domestic and foreign problems. . . . The major unknown factor is how long Zambians will continue to be willing to sacrifice immediate benefits for future advantages." Under Kenneth Kaunda, "The Zambesi region has . . . emerged as an arena of conflict between white-ruled Southern Africa and independent black Africa."

Zambia's Foreign Policy

By B. V. MTSHALI

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IN DISCUSSING ZAMBIA'S relations with the world, three cardinal facts must be noted. First of all, Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.), led by President Kenneth Kaunda, refuses to allow the country's geographical position as a landlocked state to determine its policy, especially toward its white neighbors whose racial policies the Zambian government has condemned as immoral. Second, Zambia's refusal to bow to the dictates of geography is backed by economic resources which allow the government a wide range of options in foreign policy. Finally, Zambia's success in pursuing policies of her own choice is conditioned by historical forces and is dependent on domestic and external circumstances.¹

On the basis of the positions she has adopted on various issues, Zambia's foreign policy can be analyzed in three broad categories. In extra-continental affairs and in relation to white-ruled Africa, Zambia is radical. She harps on the iniquities of the present international order, dominated by the West; nor does she hesitate to point an accusing finger at alleged abuses of power and abdication of their responsibilities by states acting out of expedi-

ency. With regard to white-ruled Africa, she condemns as dehumanizing the racial policies followed by the minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. In sum, in these two areas, Zambia displays a marked degree of radicalism characterized by a strong attachment to morality.

However, in intercontinental affairs, Zambia's foreign policy is flexible, veering between the national interest and morality. Thus, in 1968, she recognized Biafra because:

Whereas it is our ardent desire to foster African Unity, it would be morally wrong to force anybody into unity founded on blood and bloodshed. For unity to be meaningful and beneficial, it must be based on the consent of all the parties concerned, offering security and justice to all.²

It is difficult to interpret this decision in terms of Zambia's material interests, whether immediate or ultimate, or in terms of her prestige, which was not enhanced. On the contrary, it was tarnished because the recognition of Biafra put Zambia in the company of Tanzania, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, who held the minority view on this question, disapproved by the overwhelming membership of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). The recognition of Biafra was thus based on moral grounds or grounds perceived as moral by the government in Lusaka.

Zambia's recognition, until early 1970, of Kwame Nkrumah as the legal ruler of Ghana

¹ For a general picture of Zambia six months after independence, see Richard Brown's article in *Current History*, April, 1965, pp. 201-203.

² *Statement on the Recognition of the Republic of Biafra*, May 20, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Zambia).

cannot be explained in these terms. Zambia has always insisted that she will maintain friendly relations only with states under civilian rule, and has condemned military rule in strong terms. In an address to the Zambian Army and Air Force officers, in March, 1967, President Kaunda asserted that since the armed forces are

ill-equipped to rule, there follows [when they take over] an inevitable train of disaster and general chaos bringing misery not only to the innocent but even to the perpetrators themselves. Suddenly there is a return to the dark ages. . . .³

In consequence, Zambia has insisted on the restoration of civilian rule as the prerequisite for the normalization of relations between herself and the state concerned. The election of Kofi A. Busia as Prime Minister of Ghana would seem to meet this very requirement. Nonetheless, Zambia has not yet made the expected decision. Instead, she expressed reservations about the fairness of the election. Strangely enough, she maintains diplomatic relations with the Congo (Kinshasa), Somalia and Biafra—all of which are under military rule. In short, in this area one notices flexibility, manifesting itself sometimes in inconsistencies.

Toward her immediate African neighbors, Zambia tends to favor the status quo and legitimacy. Thus, she favors the retention of colonial boundaries against the territorial claims made indirectly by Malawi. Nor are her economic relations with these neighbors conducted in any but strictly business terms. In brief, one can distinguish in Zambian foreign policy three levels, analytically distinct but operationally closely related.

The personification of this foreign policy is President Kaunda. Since independence in 1964, he has given it his own imprint—one that has a strong moralistic character, although not at the expense of the national interest. On the declamatory level, it is moralistic; but on the operational level, it serves to protect and promote the country's interests.

In evaluating this policy, a distinction must be drawn between the short and the long term. Thus, the condemnation of minority and racial rule and the consequent severance of long-standing links with the South entails sacrifice and hardship, but only in the short run. In the long run, however, this disengagement from the South is in Zambia's interests. As she turns to East Africa, Zambia will cease to be a market for goods from Rhodesia and South Africa. She will be in a position to develop her own industries and find markets for them in, for example, East Africa. This economic self-determination is not enjoyed by Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland, whose economic dependence on South Africa reduces their political options. In short, over the long term, this disengagement from the South, this rejection of communication links and economic constraints, will accelerate the process of decolonization in Zambia and thereby give real meaning to formal independence.

THE LUSAKA MANIFESTO

But while her opposition to the South is as implacable as her determination to effect change is unflagging, Zambia has offered to cooperate with the states of Southern Africa if they take genuine steps towards majority rule. This in no way implies immediate majority rule by Africans. Such a conciliatory approach marks a departure from the demands for one-man, one-vote hitherto current in African circles. Zambia's new attitude is embodied in the Lusaka Manifesto adopted by the East and Central African states in Lusaka in April, 1969, and later in the year by the O.A.U. and the U.N. General Assembly.* President Kaunda was largely responsible for its inspiration and formulation. As reflected in the Manifesto, Zambia's attitude toward the South may seem ambivalent and inconsistent. In reality, however, it shows Zambia's pursuit of a two-pronged policy governed by morality and the national interest.

Why has Zambia embarked on such a policy? The explanation lies in Kaunda's outlook—the objectives he has set, and the re-

³ Kaunda, *The Role of the Zambia Defence Force* (Lusaka, 1967), pp. 3-4.

* For excerpts see pp. 173 ff. of this issue.

sources he has at his disposal for the pursuit of these objectives.

President Kaunda is Head of State and of government, head of the U.N.I.P. and (since late 1960) Foreign Minister. It would not be inappropriate to describe him as a socialist who regards theology and religion as a vehicle of man's betterment. This is evident from his concern for man, formulated in his philosophy of Humanism and enunciated in his writings after 1966 and especially in pamphlets which appeared in the following year.⁴ This religio-social outlook determines his objectives for the development of Zambia and for Zambia's role in the world.

Thus, Kaunda believes Zambia should be genuinely free—hence the Mulungushi Reforms which are designed to insure that the economy of the country is in the control of Zambians⁵; and hence the nationalization of the copper mines, announced in the Matero Declaration of August, 1969, and effective January 1, 1970. Again, for Kaunda political independence consists in freedom of choice of partners with whom Zambia can enter into various arrangements in the pursuit of her foreign policy objectives. In sum, this means disengagement from constraints from the South in order to diversify the country's dependency relationships.

In this regard, Zambia's new links with Italy may signify the ultimate displacement of the United Kingdom as Zambia's source of supplies in a number of important areas. Zambia chose to increase her military assistance from Italy in the form of Agusta helicopters and the training of pilots because she thought that her Loan Personnel Agreement with Great Britain entailed too many re-

strictions on her sovereignty. British Army officers could not be used in combat operations against internal and external enemies; and the output of pilots for the Air Force—vital as a support for the Army—was regarded as very slow. For this reason, the agreement was terminated on December 31, 1969, and Zambia turned to Italian aid, which was felt to be more agreeable in terms of cost and output of personnel.

Apart from the military aspect, in 13 months Italy managed to build an oil pipeline, running from the Copperbelt to Dar es Salaam. This became operational in September, 1968, and ended Zambia's dependence on oil supplies from Mozambique and Rhodesia. The contract for refining the oil was awarded to an Italian firm, the state-owned E.N.I. In addition, the automobile manufacturer, Fiat, has offered attractive terms for the construction of an assembly plant to be based in Livingstone, Zambia's southernmost town. Due to start production in 1972, the plant will have an annual output of 5,000 automobiles of under 2,000 c.c. engine capacity, the small and medium-sized models. Through this Fiat project, Zambia expects to make substantial savings in foreign exchange. The purchase of automobiles from Great Britain, West Germany, Japan and France is likely to be limited or prohibited altogether in order to make the locally assembled Fiats profitable.⁶ Finally, it must also be noted that through Alitalia, Italy operates Zambia's fledgling commercial airline, Zambia Airways.

In a broader sense, this turn toward Italy can be viewed as a manifestation of Zambia's nonalignment. In 1967, Kaunda described the aim of this approach as

providing for ourselves such a framework in our dealings with the outside world that we will praise when this is due, and indeed criticize when this is called for.⁷

Viewed in terms of Zambia's precarious situation as a country sandwiched between minority-ruled Southern Africa and the African states to the north and the east of her borders, this policy of disengagement would be difficult to execute unless Zambia had

⁴ Kaunda, Opening Address, Annual Conference of U.N.I.P., Mulungushi, August 15, 1967, in *Mulungushi Conference 1967 Proceedings*; and *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation* (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1967).

⁵ Kaunda, *Zambia, Towards Economic Independence*, Address to the U.N.I.P. National Council, Mulungushi, April 19, 1968 (Lusaka: Cabinet Office, 1968).

⁶ See the government-owned *Zambia Mail*, December 3, 1969, and the government-supporting *Times of Zambia*, December 9, 1969.

⁷ Kaunda, Opening Address, *Mulungushi Conference 1967*, p. 21.

enormous resources at her disposal. Zambia can afford to pursue it because she owns a rich copper industry; she is the world's third largest copper producer, after the United States and the U.S.S.R.⁸ In 1968, she produced 750,000 short tons of copper and cobalt worth K534 million.** From this industry alone, the government's revenue was K183 million or 60 per cent of its total revenue of K305 million. The copper industry also accounted for 44 per cent of Zambia's net domestic product, and provided 95 per cent of her domestic exports. In addition, it employed 50,000 people or 14 per cent of the total national labor force. Until 1969, this industry, which is the mainstay of the economy, was controlled by two non-Zambian companies: Anglo-American Corporation, which is South African and British; and Roan Selection Trust, which is British and American. In the latter company, American Metal Climax of New York City held a 45 per cent stock interest. Then in August, 1969, President Kaunda announced the nationalization of the seven mines controlled by these companies in order to "set this nation well and truly on the road to its economic independence."⁹ In terms of the announcement, Zambia acquired a controlling interest of 51 per cent. The companies received 49 per cent and contracts for managing the mines on behalf of the state.

THE DOMESTIC CHALLENGE

Understandably, the policy of disengagement from the South has raised many domestic and foreign problems. It has been suggested that such a policy may overstrain Zambian resources. This argument was recently advanced by a South African publication with regard to Zambia's response to

Rhodesian independence.¹⁰ With the tide of rising expectations sweeping through the new states (partly as a result of promises made by politicians during the struggle for independence), the postponement of immediate benefits is difficult for some Zambians to appreciate. The so-called common man expects independence to deliver the goods now, in his lifetime, so that he can savor the fruit of his toil and sacrifice for the cause of freedom.

On the domestic level, the most crucial problem for Zambia is economic. The diverting of resources from sorely-needed development projects to new communication routes to East Africa, especially Tanzania, and the reduction of imports, particularly consumer goods, from Rhodesia and South Africa—the traditional sources of supply—have raised the cost of living immensely. For instance, the Ministry of Labor reported that in 1968 the Consumer Price Index calculated for higher income groups (January 1962 = 100) rose from 126.5 in December, 1967, to 135.2 in December, 1968, while that for the lower income groups rose from 138.8 in December, 1967, to 147.4 in December, 1968.¹¹ It is obvious that the sharpest pinch is felt by the African population, mostly in the urban areas where congestion is increasing rapidly. In consequence, there is unrest in the labor movement and among the small businessmen represented by the Zambia Traders' Association.

In the rural areas, there is also discontent on account of limited development. An outstanding example is the uncompleted road from Serenje in the Central Province to Samfya in the Luapula Province. Widely publicized in 1965 because the President and some members of his Cabinet dug the first portion, this road was designed to bypass the unreliable road through the Congo pedicle, where delays and molestations by Congolese have been reported. Lack of funds has prevented the completion of this road. As a result, agricultural produce from Luapula Province cannot be transported in large quantities to the markets in the Copperbelt where it is in great demand.

⁸ *Copperbelt of Zambia Mining Industry Year Book 1968* (Kitwe: 1969), p. 34.

** The Kwacha is worth U.S. \$1.40.

⁹ Kaunda, *Towards Complete Independence*, Address to the U.N.I.P. National Council, Matero Hall, Lusaka, August 11, 1969 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1969).

¹⁰ *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), January 5, 1968, pp. 32–33.

¹¹ Ministry of Labour, *Annual Report for 1968* (Lusaka: 1969), p. 5.

To make matters worse, the agricultural sector provides little employment or sufficient allurements for the rural folk. For this reason the Western Province (formerly the Barotsse) used to send a large portion of its able-bodied men to the gold mines in South Africa through the recruiting agency called the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA). But, in 1966, the government banned this recruitment on the grounds that Zambians were being subjected in South Africa to the inhuman policy of apartheid. However, at the same time, little alternative employment was available in Zambia. The result was massive economic discontent which manifested itself in the 1968 general elections in which U.N.I.P. candidates, including Cabinet ministers from the Western Province, suffered a major defeat.¹² Another result was the revival of rumors of secession by this province from the Republic of Zambia.¹³ Bordering on South Africa and Rhodesia, both the Western and the Southern provinces, inhabited respectively by the Lozi and the Tonga, stood to lose economic advantages from the policy of disengagement from the South, whereas the turn to East Africa would inevitably profit the largely Bemba areas in the north. In short, the economic effects of disengagement have tended to exacerbate tribal tension.

This policy has also heightened interracial tension; for while rural and urban Zambians feel the pinch of this foreign policy deeply, expatriate employees are paid comparatively high salaries by government and private industry. This can be deduced from the rela-

tively low rise in their cost of living reflected in the Consumer Price Index mentioned above. The consequence of this wage differential has been racial tension, particularly on the Copperbelt, where European miners are accused of supporting the minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia.¹⁴ For this reason, even private clubs have been forbidden to celebrate the anniversary of Rhodesia's U.D.I.

Related to the economic factor as a cause of racial and tribal tension is security. Zambia's territorial integrity has been frequently violated by numerous Rhodesian and Portuguese aircraft, military personnel and intelligence agents, some of whom have been apprehended on Zambian soil and publicly dealt with.¹⁵ Therefore Zambians tend to suspect expatriates of siding with and abetting their enemy. At the same time, they cannot get rid of them because there are few skilled Zambians to replace them. As two government reports have shown, Zambia still has a great shortage of skilled manpower because of the poor educational facilities provided for Africans before independence.¹⁶

The so-called crisis between the Executive and the Judiciary which occurred in July, 1969, was merely the ventilation of pent-up emotion by some members of the public. The release of two Portuguese soldiers by the Zambian High Court, then exclusively European in composition, after they had crossed into Zambia from Angola, convinced some Zambians that white people could not be trusted. Feeling was particularly strong against the Chief Justice, Irish-born James J. Skinner, who before his appointment had been U.N.I.P.'s top lawyer and strategist. Skinner resigned and left the country.

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

On the foreign level, Zambia's determination to force a change in the minority rule in the South manifests itself in support for the liberation movements from these territories. Many of them have offices in Lusaka in the Liberation Center directed by President Kaunda's personal representative, the ex-soldier Mukuḱa Nkoloso. The center's

¹² For an excellent study of the election, see Ian Scott and Robert Molteno, "The Zambian General Elections," *Africa Report*, Vol. 14, No. 1, January, 1969.

¹³ For secessionism in this province, see Gerald L. Caplan, "Barotseland: the Secessionist Challenge to Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, October, 1968, pp. 343-360.

¹⁴ R. B. Sutcliffe, "Crisis on the Copperbelt," *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 12, December, 1966, pp. 499-502.

¹⁵ *Report of the Tribunal on Detainees* (Lusaka: Cabinet Office, 1967), and Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles, Kaunda and the White South* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), ch. 12.

¹⁶ *Manpower Report 1965-6* and *Zambian Manpower 1969* (Lusaka).

aim is to serve as a propaganda forum for these movements so that they can counter the propaganda issued for international consumption by the minority regimes. But some of them have active at-home guerrillas whose exploits are publicized from the center (as for example, the joint statement issued by the African National Congress of South Africa and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union confirming that their forces were operating in Rhodesia in August, 1967). South Africa and Rhodesia use statements like this to prove that Zambia harbors "terrorists" and allows her territory to be used as a launching-pad for guerrilla attacks against them. Since 1966, the South has threatened to make preemptive strikes on alleged guerrilla camps in Zambia. It has also retaliated by bombing villages on the Zambian borders. This is particularly true of the Portuguese, who have bombed Zambian villages near the border of Angola and Mozambique.¹⁷

Domestically, public reaction to these threats has largely supported the government. Nevertheless, some Zambians feel that Zambia should not support the liberation movements at the expense of her own security. This is the view of the African National Congress of Zambia, led by Harry M. Nkumbula. During the campaign for the 1968 general election, Nkumbula accused the U.N.I.P. government of dereliction of duty in this respect. He promised that while, if elected, he would do everything to help Rhodesian Africans achieve their independence, "I will make sure that Zambia's interests come first."¹⁸ Concerning the nature of the assistance he would give, he said, "We'll give all moral support to our brothers down South."¹⁹ On the government's general policy toward the South, his comment was that it was "highly hypocritical and pretentious for Zambia's

leaders to condemn South Africa and Rhodesia while trading with them." His party, he declared, favored "an open mind and approach" in dealing with these countries. Consequently it opposed the imposition of trade restrictions between Zambia and South Africa and Rhodesia. This opposition also applied to the United Nations sanctions. In this connection, Nkumbula observed that the "so-called mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia have done more harm to Zambia than to any other U.N. member country."²⁰ In his view, Zambia should not be concerned at all since the Rhodesian question was "primarily a matter between the British Government and the people of Rhodesia."²¹

In the author's view, however, the aid to the liberation movements ought to be judged in terms of Zambia's long-range interests. On account of her geographical location, Zambia may find it prudent not to rely on any single African neighbor. Although relations may be warm, they might change at some later date to Zambia's detriment. Therefore it would seem that Zambia should surround herself with as many friendly neighbors as possible to have a wide range of options. Aid to the liberation movements is based on the expectation that once in office in their own countries they will be friendly and helpful to Zambia. In sum, Zambia's aid is governed by moral principle and self-interest.

THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY

On account of the country's geographical location, the government has been at pains to ensure access to the sea for imports and exports. But in this regard, U.N.I.P.'s declared preference has been to maintain trade and communication ties with countries whose policies are similar to Zambia's. Thus from its foundation in 1959, U.N.I.P. adopted a staunch Pan-African outlook, and indicated

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¹⁷ See *Die Burger* (Cape Town), December 9, 1968, p. 10, which contains extensive quotations from a diplomatic note by the Portuguese on this matter.

¹⁸ *Times of Zambia*, December 5, 1968.

¹⁹ *Interview: Radio Zambia*, December 17, 1968.

²⁰ *Times of Zambia*, October 7, 1968, and December 5, 1968.

²¹ *Die Transvaler* (Johannesburg), December 2, 1968, p. 11.

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"Kenya has made dramatic economic and social progress in her six years of independence, but many problems are not amenable to quick or easy solutions," notes this author, who points out that the new government, like its predecessor, has been designed "to balance all ethnic groups and to co-opt potential critics by making them subject to collective responsibility."

Election Year Politics in Kenya

BY JAY E. HAKES

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THE ASSASSINATION OF Minister for Economic Planning and Development Tom Mboya in July, the detention of opposition leader Oginga Odinga in October, and national elections in December established 1969 as the most dramatic year in the politics of Kenya since independence in 1963.

The assassination, detention and resulting tribal animosity threatened the political stability and economic growth that Kenya enjoyed under President Jomo Kenyatta. The election, however, which produced a large turnover in the membership of the National Assembly despite the absence of an opposition party, seems to have a cathartic effect, so that by the end of the year tensions were substantially reduced.

Tom Mboya, just returned from executive sessions of the African Economic Commission in Addis Ababa, was shot and killed on July 5, while leaving a Nairobi drugstore. Although Nahashon Isaac Njenga Njoroge was eventually convicted of the murder and was executed, none of the people who had been on crowded Government Road when Mboya was killed identified him as the murderer; the conviction rested almost entirely on Njoroge's possession of the gun that tests showed had fired the fatal bullets. The trial and the appeal failed to deal with the question—which many were asking—of whether

any prominent politicians were involved in arranging the assassination.

The assassination cost Kenya her most articulate spokesman to the outside world, her still young (at 39) economic planner, the secretary-general of the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU), and one of her ablest political strategists. Having risen in politics through the labor movement, through organization in urban areas, and through effectiveness in governmental planning rather than through ethnic appeals, Mboya had never matched the following among his Luo tribesmen enjoyed by Odinga, nor had his political stock nationally been high in the year before his death. Yet he had remained the pivotal man in Kenya politics. The splits that have plagued KANU since its formation in 1961 always seemed to break down less along ethnic or ideological lines than along the lines of who was for or against Mboya.

The assassination crystalized tribal antagonisms, especially those between Luo and Kikuyu. Many Luo noted that Njoroge was a Kikuyu and held the Kikuyus responsible for Mboya's death. At the funeral, stones were thrown at Kenyatta's presidential limousine, because Kenyatta is a Kikuyu. Such an attack had previously been thought impossible because of Kenyatta's national stature.

The rising tensions widened the already large gulf between the KANU government and Kenya's only opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.). Formed in 1966 by supporters of the until then Vice President Oginga Odinga and dissidents to the left of the government, K.P.U. began with support in many tribes. Because Odinga was its most influential supporter, K.P.U. was always dominated by Luos, and its support in other areas steadily eroded after its formation.

Some weeks after Mboya's assassination, K.P.U. vice president Bildad Kaggia resigned to rejoin KANU. A Kikuyu, Kaggia was an important leader in the independence movement. He had been detained with Kenyatta in the 1950's, but had split with the government in 1964 and had become an outspoken critic of its policies, particularly those on land. His defection left K.P.U. with only some Kamba support to prevent its becoming an entirely Luo organization; the ethnic factor in politics was thereby accentuated.

Ethnic tensions were also aggravated in August by a bitter dispute over Kikuyu oathing, which apparently began in response to the throwing of stones at Kenyatta's limousine and related incidents. Oaths, a traditional source of cohesion among Kikuyu, were an important component of the Mau Mau revolt in the 1950's; so many Kenyans became alarmed when truckloads of Kikuyus traveled to the President's home at Gatundu to pledge their loyalty, and when forced oathing was reported in several areas.

Tom Okelo-Odongo charged in Parliament that the oaths were an attempt to encourage government by unconstitutional means. Although Okelo-Odongo was a K.P.U. member, he received support from an important KANU backbencher, Masinde Muliro, who said, "If the oaths are being taken for purposes of disruption, let us all be ready to fight." By September, a minister, two assistant ministers, and several M.P.'s had petitioned the government publicly to stop the forced oathing.

The crisis psychology pervading politics after the assassination continued through

October. Near the end of the month, Kenyatta addressed a public meeting at Kisumu, where he engaged in a verbal confrontation with Odinga. Shortly thereafter, the police, believing that the President was endangered, fired on the crowd. At least nine persons were killed and many were injured.

Almost immediately, the government whisked Odinga, K.P.U. deputy leader and Kamba M.P. Joseph Nthula, the six other K.P.U. M.P.'s and publicity secretary Achieng-Oneko off to detention on the grounds that K.P.U. had engaged in subversive activities. This action left no opposition party to contest the general elections anticipated at that time in early 1970, but in fact begun in December, 1969, and completed with a meaningless general election in January, 1970.

PATTERNS OF TRIBALISM

Besides the disputes over oathing and K.P.U., there were other less publicized incidents in the second half of 1969 that demonstrated the saliency of the ethnic factor in Kenya politics.

One of these incidents involved a move by the Minister for Education, Julius Kiano, to replace the expatriate heads at 12 of the country's leading schools with Africans—a move that normally would have received broad support. The revelation, however, that the minister, a Kikuyu, had circumvented the Public Service Commission and appointed 10 Kikuyu to the posts produced an uproar in Parliament. Some of the appointments were eventually withdrawn, but only after KANU unity had been seriously strained.

This particular incident, perhaps not itself of crucial importance, was an example of a kind of tribal competition that occurs frequently between Kenya's larger tribes (in order of population, the Kikuyu, Luo, Luyia and Kamba). These populous tribes are relatively well educated and urbanized. As a result, they frequently find themselves competing for the same benefits, such as development projects or jobs. With the unavoidable disappointment that follows many

requests for development projects or jobs and the occasional distribution of benefits on the basis of family or "connections," tribal antagonism inevitably follows.

There are ironies to this kind of tribal conflict. First, it is facilitated by a factor associated with modernity, that is, the mobility which makes possible inter-tribal contact and competition in urban areas. Second, the more success the government has in generating economic development, the more intense the competition for benefits.

Another incident in late 1969, the arrest of a dissident KANU M.P., M. J. Seroney, called attention to a second type of tribal conflict. Seroney published and distributed a "Nandi Hills Declaration," which sought rights for the relatively small Nandi tribe over other communities settling in its area. As a result, he was arrested and convicted of sedition, but was eventually let off with a fine.

The kind of conflict illustrated by this incident occurs between large tribes and the numerous smaller tribes. With their greater education and mobility, members of larger tribes can take advantage of opportunities in land settlement and in business in less developed areas, where the members of smaller, indigenous tribes view them as "invaders." This kind of conflict occurs in rural rather than urban settings. It too has its ironies, since entrepreneurship—normally valued as a spur to economic development and displayed in Kenya by large tribes, especially the Kikuyu—is a direct cause of much of the resentment expressed by the less developed tribes. When the social bases of tribal conflict discussed above and personality clashes among leaders of various ethnic communities reinforce each other, as they did in 1969, tribal antagonisms pose especially difficult dilemmas for the government.

While issues associated with tribal conflict grabbed headlines in 1969, economic prob-

lems continued, including problems of land settlement, unemployment and rural development.

BEHIND THE ETHNIC ISSUE

Kenya has made dramatic economic and social progress in her six years of independence, but many problems are not amenable to quick or easy solutions. Unemployment in urban areas is one example. The number of jobs is increasing because of the expansion of the economy and Africanization programs. Whenever new jobs are created, however, the openings attract even more job-seekers to the city and thus aggravate rather than alleviate the unemployment problem.¹ Because of the mixed results of creating new jobs, the government has committed itself to a policy of rural development. In its most dramatic implementation of this policy, in January, 1968, the government began to require that the two main urban centers, Nairobi and Mombasa, transfer half their receipts from the graduated personal tax to county councils in order to stimulate development in rural areas.

Related to these economic problems are two factors with important political ramifications. First, on every issue, the government is confronted with the people's rising expectations, which are difficult to satisfy and sometimes even contradictory. Second, there is a large gulf between a relatively small elite of Europeans, Asians and Africans, and the mass of the people. All members of Parliament are part of the elite (in East Africa frequently called the *wabenzi*, a Swahili word meaning those who drive Mercedes Benz cars), because of their relatively high incomes.

The issues of elitism and wealthy politicians emerged as public disputes in 1969. In June, the government introduced its annual estimates, which surreptitiously included gratuities (usually lump sums received upon retirement) for ministers and assistant ministers. After a public outcry against the extra payments, a communication from Speaker Humphrey Slade that such payments had already been paid but had never been

¹ For a deductive argument along these lines, see John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, "Urban Unemployment in East Africa: An Economic Analysis of Policy Alternatives," *East African Economic Review*, Vol. 4, n.s. (1968), pp. 17-36.

authorized by Parliament, and two tense divisions, a coalition of KANU backbenchers and opposition M.P.'s succeeded in July in blocking consideration of the estimates and demanded that the provisions for gratuities be removed from them.

After this rebuff, Attorney General Charles Njonjo introduced a government bill to legalize payments to ministers and assistant ministers of 20 per cent of their salaries, retroactive to 1962 and paid at the discretion of the President. The government also apologized for not seeking parliamentary authorization earlier, added to the bill an increase in retirement benefits for backbenchers, and applied strong pressure on them to support the bill. The bill then sailed through with only a few opposing votes, although the government whip, Martin Shikuku, declared: "Even in the eyes of God I would be stealing if I allowed this money to be given to Ministers when there are people dying of disease in my constituency."² The whole incident displayed a remarkable lack of sensitivity on the part of a government anticipating general elections.

It can be argued that the gulfs between rich and poor and between expectations and performance discussed above are more basic problems than tribalism in Kenya. Both gulfs undermine confidence in KANU and in government institutions, and the resulting cynicism encourages a transfer of loyalty to ethnic groups.

PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS

The assassination of Mboya was not the only cause of heightened tensions in 1969. Anticipation of Kenya's first general elections in over six years had begun to quicken the pace of political activity even before the assassination.

As soon as the President announced at Madaraka Day ceremonies in June, 1969, that elections would be held within a year, the KANU parliamentary group and the

KANU national executive committee, both previously dormant, began to meet regularly. Excitement was encouraged not only by the fact that general elections would be the first since independence but by memories of troubles in recent local government and by-elections.

Local government elections, normally of minor importance, were, in 1968, to be the first national test between KANU and K.P.U. and the first elections conducted under legislation banning candidates running without party sponsorship. Although intended to strengthen party machinery, the ban against independent candidates stirred dissension within KANU as political rivals jostled to control the nomination process, which was perceived as being tantamount to election in areas where the party was strong. Some of the popular candidates passed over by KANU switched to the K.P.U. side, and the opposition soon found itself with unexpected strength. However, after a meeting in late July, presided over by the President and attended by KANU officials and Kenya's 41 district commissioners, the D.C.'s, who also served as returning officers for the elections, ruled that the nomination papers of all K.P.U. candidates had been completed incorrectly, a deficiency found on none of the KANU papers. The election fiasco undermined confidence in KANU's ability to nominate popular candidates in an orderly manner and in the government's willingness to permit fair elections.

A by-election in May, 1969, reinforced suspicions about KANU's nominating process. When the government permitted a free election for a seat made vacant by the death of a prominent Luo minister, C. M. G. Argwings-Kodhek, the KANU candidate was trounced so badly that he lost his deposit. The election demonstrated Odinga's strength in his home area, but it was also clear that KANU could have done better had it nominated a more popular candidate.³

In light of these events, it is not surprising that President Kenyatta indicated in his Madaraka Day speech that candidates would be nominated by primary elections. Elec-

² Kenya National Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates*, August 5, 1969, col. 2850.

³ See John J. Okumu, "The By-Election in Gem: An Assessment," *East Africa Journal*, Vol. 6 (June, 1969), pp. 9-17.

tions under the new system were anticipated in early 1970, since the government planned to have the constituencies redrawn after the results of the August census were known. After the opposition was eliminated, however, the government quickly scheduled the primary elections for December 6, 1969.

In preparation for the elections, KANU issued its traditional party manifesto, in which President Kenyatta declared:

KANU has kept faith with the people of Kenya in accordance with our 1963 manifesto where we promised to utilize the political independence to uplift the living standards of the *wananchi* [Swahili for citizens].

The party required that candidates in the primaries limit themselves to the manifesto, thereby precluding public disagreement over policy.

An important question was who would be allowed to run in the KANU elections. The most important requirement in this regard was that candidates be paid up members of KANU for at least six months before the elections. Civil servants, though required to resign by the end of October (before the date of the elections was announced) in order to run, were exempted from this requirement, and even former members of K.P.U. could be exempted with the permission of the President. In fact, recent members of K.P.U. such as Mrs. Grace Onyango, former Mayor of Kisumu, and Kaggia, were allowed to run. Candidates were also required to sign and read publicly a loyalty pledge to the party. A total of 622 would-be candidates placed deposits of £50 (\$140) with the party, and very little screening took place, as KANU provincial vice presidents vetoed only six of them.

The elimination of Kenya's only opposition party did not change the election scene as much as might be expected. The government had always banned K.P.U.'s public meetings and had otherwise used its powers

(including detention) to suppress it, even before Odinga himself was detained.

INTERPRETING THE ELECTIONS

Primary elections on December 6 (which for all practical purposes elected the 158 constituency members in the National Assembly) and consequent reshuffling of the cabinet climaxed the hectic events of 1969. In a moderate turnout of voters, 5 of the 19 ministers running for reelection and 14 of the 29 assistant ministers were defeated in the primaries; incumbent backbenchers fared even worse. Late in the month, President Kenyatta, who along with Vice President Daniel arap Moi was elected without opposition, announced that his 23-man Cabinet would include six new ministers.⁴

The elections demonstrated the options available to voters within Kenya's new one-party system. Nevertheless, the meaning of the elections was not immediately clear, since several trends, some ambiguous and even contradictory, could be identified.

In Luo areas of Nyanza Province, where both government ministers and all other incumbents were defeated in a surprisingly heavy poll, the results clearly demonstrated widespread opposition to the government. Considerable caution must be used, however, in applying this interpretation to the country as a whole. First, the results are strikingly similar to those in the 1965 elections in neighboring Tanzania (also conducted within a one-party framework) and are therefore not as unusual as they might at first appear. Second, Kenyatta urged voters many times before the elections to reject M.P.'s who stayed in Nairobi instead of working in their constituencies, and he repeated this sentiment shortly after the elections when announcing that none of the defeated candidates would be included among the 12 "national members" of parliament appointed by the President. Third, government ministers—those most closely associated with the government—did well, at least in relative terms. Fourth, some outspoken critics of the government, most notably Bildad Kaggia, were defeated. Finally,

⁴ The author is grateful to Richard Sandbrook, David Leonard, and the Kenyan Embassy for helping to make complete results of the elections and the formation of the Cabinet quickly available.

the structure of the elections encouraged voting on the basis of personalities and local issues.

On the other hand, critics of the government and potential supporters of Odinga fared remarkably well. Such former prominent members of K.P.U. as trade unionist Denis Akumu and Mrs. Grace Onyango, were elected in Nyanza, but six non-Luo former M.P.'s who had been defeated while running under the K.P.U. banner in the "little general election" of 1966 won in other areas.⁵ In addition, prominent critics on the KANU backbenches, such as Martin Shikuku, M. J. Seroney, and Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, won easily. It could also be argued that the success of ministers should not be attributed so much to their general popularity as to their ability to bring the fruits of development to their particular constituencies.

The African elite, as well as the critics of the government, scored heavily in the elections. Many of the newcomers to Parliament are highly educated and successful. For example, Zachary Onyonka, who defeated Minister for Local Government Lawrence Sagini, had taught economics at the University College, Nairobi; J. L. M. Shako, winner over Minister of Works Dawson Mwanyumba, had served as Ambassador to Germany and France and as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defense; and Odongo Omano, who won in Odinga's old constituency, had been head of Edgerton Agricultural College. Also victorious were Maina Wanjigi, former chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, Charles Rubia, wealthy businessman and former Mayor of Nairobi, Burudi Nabwera, ex-Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles Murgor, who resigned as Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza, and Lucas Ngureti, former chairman of the Kenya National Trading Corporation.

⁵ For background on the "little general election," see George Bennett, "Kenya's 'little general election,'" *World Today*, Vol. 22 (1966), pp. 336-343, and David Koff, "Kenya's Little General Election," *Africa Report*, Vol. 11 (October, 1966), pp. 57-60.

The success of the elite was, in part, a reflection of the rapid social progress in Kenya since independence and of the availability of more capable candidates in 1969 than in 1963. It can also be attributed to the bargaining between different areas for the benefits of development that characterizes politics in Kenya. Constituencies that elect members of high calibre increase their chances of having ministers as their representatives and thus as their "negotiators" for development.

The talent produced by the elections eased Kenyatta's task of forming a new government but it can create problems as well. With more ability and ambition to be found among backbenchers, the government will have to expend increased energy communicating with them, or face their stern criticism in Parliament.

Although Kenyatta's reorganization of the government was rather conservative in light of the election results, it did mirror many of the election trends. All 15 ministers returned to Parliament (including one presidential appointment) received their old portfolios or were given new ones. Of the six new ministers, two were former backbenchers and frequent critics of the government—Taita Towett and Masinde Muliro; all were highly educated (including Onyonka, Omamo, and Shako mentioned above); and two were Luo.

A similar pattern prevailed in the appointment of assistant ministers. Most of those reelected were chosen again. Of the 19 new appointments, 11 were former M.P.'s (including 4 former K.P.U. M.P.'s) and 8 were newcomers to Parliament. In all, the government was designed, as before, to balance all ethnic groups and to co-opt potential

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"Nyerere's basic commitments to self-reliance has been pursued with a consistency and tenacity which have lent order and stability to post-independence Tanzania."

Tanzania: Commitment to Self Reliance

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

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TANZANIA, WHICH IS as large as France and West Germany combined, is a strategically important country. It lies astride the major route for the evacuation of Zambian copper; it provides a haven for liberation movements which are actively engaged in insurrection against Portuguese rule in neighboring Mozambique. In addition, Tanzania offers outlets for Congolese products as well as those of Rwanda and Burundi. Thus, a number of African neighbors have an abiding interest in the political and economic evolution of contemporary Tanzania.

Consisting largely of an elevated plateau ranging between 3,000 and 4,000 feet in height, the mainland portion of Tanzania (called Tanganyika) embraces a land area of 352,000 square miles. The bulk of the population, numbering 12.5 million people, is clustered along the fertile coastal belt, in the interior lakes region and on the lower slopes of such mountains as Kilimanjaro, which rises to more than 19,000 feet. Thus, broad interior stretches are encountered where the indigenous population is sparsely settled—less than 10 persons per square mile.

This indigenous population is essentially tribal. The country has 120 tribes, each with its own distinctive language and customs. The largest, the Sukuma, numbering in excess of one million, are cattle herders and cotton growers who are located in the central plateau region (the Miombo). Related to them are the second largest tribal group, the

Nyamwezi, who are slightly to the south. The numerically smaller tribes are found in the more fertile coffee growing belts to the north. These are the Chagga of Kilimanjaro, and the Haya. Most other tribes, numbering less than 300,000 on the average, are primarily cattle herders. The most notable are the Gogo and the Masai.

A second Tanzania exists in the form of a town and urban society. The leading center is the seacoast city of Dar-es-Salaam, which also serves as the national capital. Dar is a focal point for trading, educational and commercial activity, as well as the hub for government bureaucracy. In its confines are located the national university, the main shops of the Indian and Goan communities, the government ministries, and the headquarters of mainland Tanzania's only party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). It is to Dar that the bulk of Tanzanians look for educational and governmental services, as well as for the political leadership which will knit Tanzania's diverse societies together and fashion the programs necessary for the country's economic prosperity.

The foundations for economic growth are exceedingly slender in present day Tanzania. According to recent estimates, almost 90 per cent of the population is engaged in animal husbandry and farming; but much of this activity is of a subsistence variety and, hence, makes only a marginal contribution to the modern economic sector. The country's principal commercial crops—coffee, tea, tobacco,

cotton and cashew nuts—are marketed through agricultural cooperatives which have come under rigid governmental controls. Tanzania produces little by way of manufactured products.

Within Tanzanian society, financial and skilled manpower resources are scarce, and institutional capacities to mount a development effort likely to yield dramatic early results are extremely limited. The government launched a five-year program in 1964 which attained most of its established goals. However, some indication of the obstacles to major growth is reflected in the fact that the government's goals for 1980 are the following: 1) to raise the per capita income from \$54 per annum to \$126; 2) to become self-sufficient in trained manpower; and 3) to raise the expectation of life from 35 to 50 years. As noted in a recent special study, the primary emphasis during this period will be upon the development of the agricultural sector for the purpose of achieving a substantial export surplus. Industrial planning will concentrate on production of farm implements, food processing, and consumer goods that "can serve as import substitutes in Tanzania" and as exports to Zambia, Kenya and Uganda.

THE NYERERE MYSTIQUE

When Tanganyika severed her colonial moorings on December 9, 1961, she emerged as a parliamentary democracy owing allegiance to the British Crown. Exactly one year later, Tanganyika was transformed into a republic with a President as head of government. Julius K. Nyerere was elected to serve as President, virtually by popular acclamation. Considering Nyerere's leadership role in the pre-independence period—particularly his organizational genius in fashioning TANU into a nationwide party—his endorsement by the population at large was not surprising. Indeed, after his assumption of the presidency of TANU in 1954, Julius Nyerere had become the embodiment of Tanganyikan national ideals and aspirations.

Born in 1922, Julius Nyerere spent his early childhood herding cattle for his father in the region to the north of Sukumaland. A mem-

ber of the Zanaki from the Lake Province area, he received his early education in missionary schools; he returned to Tanganyika in 1952 after receiving advanced training in Great Britain. A schoolteacher by profession, Nyerere was one of his country's handful of university graduates. Quiet and slightly didactic by nature, he gained early recognition and standing in nationalist ranks for his dogged determination, persuasiveness, strength of personality, and political acumen.

Nyerere's concern for the plight of the Tanganyikan population at large, particularly his humanism, was reflected in the TANU constitution. It established the following as TANU's basic objectives:

To prepare the people of Tanganyika for self-government and independence, and to fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing and independent.

To fight against tribalism and all isolationist tendencies among the Africans, and to build up a united nationalism.

To fight relentlessly for the establishment of a democratic form of government and, as a first step toward democracy, to fight for the introduction of the election principle in all bodies of local and central government.

To fight for the removal of every form of racialism and racial discrimination.

To encourage and organize Trade Unionism and the Cooperative Movement, and to work with Trade Unions and Cooperative Societies and other organizations whose objectives are in harmony with the aims and objectives of . . . [TANU].

The philosophy of TANU clearly bears the imprint of Nyerere. A believer in the integrity of the nationalist movement, the President sees his responsibility as that of beneficent teacher and guide of both TANU and Tanganyikan society at large. Aware of the frailties of the governing institutions inherited at independence, he has attempted to inculcate the bureaucracy with a devotion to selfless service. Conscious of the weaknesses of the national economy, he has evolved the principal of local self-help, explaining to the diverse tribal communities that foreign aid is a problematic source of ongoing assistance and that for the long haul self-reliance is the only assured basis for advancement. Through-

out, President Nyerere has behaved with a gentle dignity, occasionally remonstrating with refractory factions (sometimes even treating misguided lieutenants with harsh discipline), not infrequently moderating disputes among well-intentioned interest groups. On all occasions, the President has sought to bring inflated expectations into balance with painful realities.

Nyerere's basic commitment to self-reliance has been pursued with a consistency and tenacity which have lent order and stability to post-independence Tanzania. In practice, it has meant the preeminence of the monolithic TANU system, the subordination of the tribal and bureaucratic interests to the national welfare, and the establishment of fairly clear political and economic guidelines for action. Thus, Tanzania is committed to her own brand of pragmatic socialism at home. Regionally, Tanzania is in the forefront of African efforts to support liberation movements seeking to eliminate inequitable systems of rule in the "White Redoubt" areas of South Africa—Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. Economically and politically, Tanzania is a leading exponent of regional association—Nyerere actually offered to delay Tanganyikan independence in 1961 to insure the end of colonial rule in neighboring Kenya and to stimulate efforts to foster an East African federation. Within the world community, Tanzania is a strong advocate of Pan-Africanism, neutralism vis-à-vis the United States and Communist nations, and internationalism in terms of strong support for the United Nations.

ISSUES OF UNION AND SECURITY

President Nyerere and his supporters have been faced with a number of troublesome security problems since the mid-1960's, some of which have proved difficult. In part, these problems were inherited during the period of post-colonial transition; to a considerable extent they are a product of geographic and historic circumstances which were largely unavoidable.

Beginning in 1961, Tanganyika was compelled to deal with a lengthy procession of

security problems on her borders: 1) the Congo crisis produced major headaches, especially in 1964, when rebels in the Kivu-Katanga area attempted to use Tanganyika as a corridor for war materiel and relief supplies; 2) intermittently during the same period, large number of refugees fled into Tanganyika as a result of internecine warfare between the Hutu and Tutsi communities in neighboring Rwanda; 3) on November 11, 1965, the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence from Great Britain, provoking a new crisis which embroiled both Tanganyika and neighboring Zambia; 4) since 1965, liberation groups from Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique have used Dar as their headquarters for planning insurrectionary campaigns against white rule. As a result, occasional collisions between Tanganyikan and Portuguese forces have taken place.

The infusion of refugees, the existence of substantial numbers of African freedom fighters in Tanganyikan territory, instability along her frontiers and episodic filibustering expeditions by Portuguese forces all combine to foster a sense of uncertainty and insecurity.

Two other upsets have left their mark upon Tanganyika. The first involved the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which are only slightly more than 20 miles removed from the Tanganyikan mainland. On January 12, 1964, the Arab ruling elite was toppled from power by a militant African group, in part led by self-proclaimed "Field Marshal" John Okello. In its place, a revolutionary government was established under the leadership of President Abeid Karume. In the days which immediately followed, Karume visited Dar-es-Salaam to appeal for the dispatch of Tanganyikan forces to insure the restoration of order. On January 18, President Nyerere agreed to send 300 police.

However, Nyerere's own time of testing was at hand. Two days later, army units stationed near Dar-es-Salaam mutinied over the slow pace of Africanization within the military hierarchy. They seized control of the city and incarcerated their white officers and several key government officials. President

Nyerere escaped arrest but relied primarily upon his Defense Minister, Oscar Kambona, to cope with the mutineers. Subsequently, the infection spread to Tabora in the interior and when the Defense Minister failed to reach an accommodation with the mutineers President Nyerere appealed to the British government to assist in the restoration of civilian authority. British marines landed on January 25, 1964, and brought all resistance to an end within 24 hours.

The Nyerere government moved rapidly to resolve both the Zanzibar and the internal security problems. With regard to the former, Nyerere prevailed upon Abeid Karume to accept close political association in exchange for Tanganyikan assistance. On April 23, 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was formed with the abbreviated designation of Tanzania. Julius Nyerere is the Union President; the first Vice President is Karume, who is responsible for Zanzibari affairs; Rashide Kawawa, a loyal Nyerere lieutenant, serves as second Vice President. Within the unicameral National Assembly of 204 seats, 52 are reserved for Zanzibari representatives. The Union government at Dar has exclusive responsibility for foreign affairs, foreign trade and immigration, police and defense matters.

To rehabilitate the mainland military establishment, the Nyerere government embarked on a far reaching program of reorganization and retraining. Particular emphasis was given to the lessening of so-called professionalist impulses and the creation of a popular army in which youthful mainlanders were expected to undertake a limited period of "national service." The government initially looked to Nigeria to provide needed advisory services. However, in recent years Dar has accepted a Canadian military mission. Its program is scheduled to be completed by mid-1970, at which time the mainland will have a People's Defense Force of three battalions, support elements, and a transport and reconnaissance air wing. At that time, the Defense Force will apparently

rely upon a Communist Chinese mission which has been the principal source of equipment for the mainland military establishment.

Thus far, the Tanzanian Union has represented an ill-tuned relationship. The Zanzibar regime, which came to power on a wave of popular African reaction against Arab rule, has not been able to sustain public support. As a result, it has fallen back upon a policy of repression, paranoid denunciation of plots by "enemies of the state," and show-case trials and executions, much to the embarrassment of President Nyerere. This erratic rhythm of reaction reached its culmination in the execution of several political prisoners in October, 1969, which strained the credibility of the Union. The fact that Zanzibar maintains her own autonomous defense force, special courts, and diplomatic relations with a number of Communist countries tends to underscore the very limited control which Dar has over the Karume regime—one of the most dictatorial in the world today.

The casual observer may also experience some distress over the prospect of Chinese Communist influence within the Tanganyikan military. Some knowledgeable specialists place the number of Chinese advisers in Tanzania at more than 250. From the Tanzanian perspective, however, reliance on Peking is a natural outgrowth of President Nyerere's dedication to the termination of white rule in southern Africa. The Chinese have evinced strong support for this goal, offering arms and training to southern African liberation groups. In addition, Peking has assumed responsibility for the construction of a major railroad link between the copper fields of Zambia and the Port of Dar-es-Salaam.¹ This project will permit Zambia to avoid dependence on Rhodesia and Mozambique for the evacuation of its major export commodity, copper. Significantly, the decision to turn to Peking came after various Western countries, including the United States, rejected the opportunity to develop the strategically important railroad link. Thus, Tanzania's increasing reliance upon Peking is regarded by President Nyerere as an inherently logical and necessary gamble.

¹ See also the article on Zambia in this issue.

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS: FRELIMO

During the meeting of African Chiefs of State at Addis Ababa in 1963, which led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), there was complete agreement on the necessity to support the southern African liberation movements. A special committee was formed under O.A.U. auspices to lend support to these movements; its headquarters was situated in Dar. Over the years, this city has become a virtual Mecca for such African organizations as the National Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo), South Africa's African National Congress and Pan-African Congress, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the South-West Africa National Union (SWANU).

While Tanzania's support is unextinguishable, the interest of other independent African states has flagged appreciably in recent years. Financial subventions and other forms of material support have been greatly reduced. Petty jealousies among potential contributors together with disagreements over tactics partially explain this malaise. In addition, rivalries among the various freedom groups, as well as their deficiencies in the face of firm counter-measures by white security services, have reinforced African disenchantment.

The recent experiences of FRELIMO are instructive in this respect. Organized in 1962, the front launched a campaign of armed insurrection in northern Mozambique two years later. FRELIMO achieved considerable stature in black Africa under the inspired leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, a former professor at Syracuse University. Mondlane effectively organized 2,000-3,000 guerrilla fighters who have waged an active campaign against numerically superior Portuguese forces, occasionally with encouraging results.

However, Mondlane was assassinated in February, 1969, and FRELIMO is still reeling from the blow. A collegial leadership was established, "The Council of the Presidency," made up of Acting President Uria Simango, Defense Secretary Samora Machel and Political Secretary Marcelino Dos Santos. Their efforts have floundered, however, due to

personal rivalries and disagreements concerning the extent to which FRELIMO should depend on the Soviet Union and Communist China. A serious blow was dealt to the front when Lazaro Kavandame, the erstwhile FRELIMO civilian chief of Cabo Delgado Province, defected to the Portuguese.

The dangers of the inherently unstable relationship among the FRELIMO leaders became apparent late in 1969 when Acting President Simango publicly charged the other council members with nepotism, corruption, tribalism and assorted other offenses. Simango has since been disciplined and his effectiveness within FRELIMO is at an end. However, the death of Mondlane appears to leave the Front bereft of a unifying leader and the possibility exists that FRELIMO may ultimately fragment. Should this occur, the Nyerere government would have been dealt a severe blow in its efforts to unite and reinforce the drive of black Africa to bring down the "White Redoubt" regimes.

EAST AFRICAN COOPERATION

President Nyerere's vision of the African future has also included the formation of a well knit political association embracing all the nations of East Africa. A decade ago he proposed that a regional political federation be organized. As he observed, "The weak and divided can never hope to maintain a dignified independence." He then proposed that Tanganyika's independence be delayed pending the formation of an East African Federation under British auspices. Little interest was evinced in the proposal; however, in 1961, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika agreed that common services for the three territories should continue after independence. A new organization known as the East Afri-

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This specialist maintains that "altogether too simple, too facile and too unrealistic a view has tended to prevail concerning the instability of southern Africa, the imminence of revolution in South Africa and the importance of contradictions in the 'Bantustans' policy."

South Africa and the Wind of Change

BY RONALD B. BALLINGER

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THERE ARE MANY observers who see the remaining areas of white rule in Africa as historical anachronisms resisting, in some strange but clearly perverse fashion, the march of history. There are even more who see them as a fundamental challenge to Western political morality and a dangerous threat, therefore, to the influence and leadership of the Western world or, it may be, the United States.

To such observers, these vestigial remains of "colonialism" are the causes of ambiguities and inconsistencies in their country's policies, threatening good relations and the exercise of a constructive influence in the rest of Africa. There may be a few who are better able to look at southern Africa in the context of her historical development and in the light of her multicultural and multiracial heritage. But in any event, since the issues themselves reflect some of the gravest and most pressing problems of our century, we are, most of us, likely to approach them with the conviction that we must force the hands of Providence.

Among my convictions is one that goes back to many conferences and debates in which I participated at the University of the Witwatersrand and the South African Institute of Race Relations during the 1950's and early 1960's. It is that altogether too simple, too facile and too unrealistic a view has tended to prevail concerning the in-

stability of southern Africa, the imminence of revolution in South Africa and the importance of contradictions in the "Bantustans" policy. It is the purpose of this article to attempt to describe very briefly the international situation in which South Africa finds herself today, to examine the nature and basis of her relations with her immediate neighbors and to suggest reasons why she is certainly no weaker, certainly much more confident and may well be in a stronger position than she was a few years ago.

A decade has elapsed since British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's celebrated "wind of change" speech before the South African Parliament in Cape Town. That was 1959, the year of Sharpeville and Langa, of the first attempt on Hendrik F. Verwoerd's life and the declaration of a state of emergency, the mobilization of Citizen Force regiments, of arrests, trials, detentions and a crisis on the South African Stock Exchange. It was the year which saw the arrest and imprisonment of Robert Sobukwe, the President of the Pan-African Congress, for his part in the campaign to abolish the pass laws, and the beginning of a long ordeal which is not over yet. It also saw Eric Louw, the South African Minister for External Affairs, fail to secure advance agreement from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference to South Africa's continued membership in the event that she became a republic.

The referendum was held in October, 1960, and the majority of white South Africans voted for republic status. Then, in November, the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia instituted contentious proceedings against South Africa before the International Court of Justice, alleging the wholesale violation in letter and spirit of her mandate for the South-West Africa territory. A few months later, after a most bitter and prolonged discussion of her apartheid policies at the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth. In retrospect, Macmillan's speech, hardly remarkable in itself, seemed both to herald the year of crisis and to appear as some mysterious portent of the events still to come.

DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION

In the years that followed, South Africa found herself approaching a condition of complete diplomatic isolation while under constant and, at times, near-unanimous attack at the United Nations and in the world press. Everywhere she confronted universal condemnation of her racial policies. The undivided hostility of the African states steadily mounted and found expression in their conferences and the meetings of Afro-Asian states, and especially in the Organization for African Unity and its African Liberation Committee set up in May, 1963. But the real key to the African states' struggle for independence and self-government was, of course, the campaign against all the remaining areas of white minority government in southern Africa conducted in the United Nations. This included a successful attempt to exclude South Africa from all international organizations and especially from those concerned with Africa. Moreover, the attacks on Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique and on the white government of Rhodesia inevitably added fuel to attacks on South Africa.

It was the refusal of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to accept the contention that the dispute over apartheid constituted a present threat to international

peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter that led the African states increasingly to focus their hopes on the South-West Africa dispute and the outcome of the proceedings before the International Court, which as everyone was aware, would be a ruling from not only a "World Court" but, to quote the Charter, "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." It was expected that a ruling against South Africa—and such a ruling was widely taken for granted—would be followed by the revocation of the mandate. If South Africa failed to comply, the demand for mandatory forcible measures to implement the court's ruling could be expected to mount rapidly. No matter how determined the United Kingdom and the United States were to prevent the adoption of measures which might lead them to a confrontation with South Africa or might escalate into armed conflict, there can be no doubt that the situation constituted a very real threat to the security of South Africa and the confidence of the Nationalist government and party. And it was regarded as such.

Meanwhile, in southern Africa, other developments were taking place concurrently and moving with a rapidity that seemed to suggest a more immediate threat to South Africa's security and dominant role there. In 1961, nationalist movements sustained by supplies from bases in the Congo (Kinshasa) began a campaign of guerrilla warfare in Angola. Two years later, a similar campaign was launched in Portuguese Guinea. And, in 1964, nationalist guerrillas began operations in northern Mozambique. It quickly became clear that although the guerrilla forces had nothing spectacular to show for their efforts, Portugal was committing very considerable resources of manpower and money to the defense of these territories. Today it is estimated that there are as many as 130,000 Portuguese troops stationed in the three colonies. How long Portugal can afford to sustain such a commitment is a question which only time can answer but it has doubtless been in the minds of the South African Cabinet from the outset.

Then, in 1965, Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia, gambling heavily, one must presume, upon the inevitable if reluctant support of Balthazar Vorster's government, made its unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.). It thereby created a major crisis in Rhodesia's relations with Great Britain. Britain subsequently transferred the problem to the United Nations. The declaration also precipitated a crisis for South Africa, and one for which neither Verwoerd nor Vorster had much taste. Smith's decision had ensured that whatever action was taken either by Britain or by the United Nations, the crisis would be brought to the very borders of South Africa. Subsequently, sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia with increasing severity. The African states later demanded the extension of the mandatory sanctions against South Africa in order to enforce them against Rhodesia. Had the World Court gone on—half a year later—to rule against South Africa their case would have been very strong indeed. Moreover, the conflict between Rhodesia on the one hand and Great Britain and the United Nations on the other—indeed the very existence of an "illegal" regime—constituted an open invitation to guerrilla activity and hostile action. The questions were: could South Africa realistically expect to escape involvement there? Or for that matter in the two neighboring Portuguese territories? And then, even more important, could she afford to become involved?

Finally, there was the decision of the United Kingdom to give political independence to the three High Commission Territories—Basutoland, now Lesotho; Bechuanaland, now Botswana; and Swaziland. The first two became independent in 1966 and the third in 1968. At the beginning of the century, when the constitution of the Union of South Africa was being framed, the African inhabitants of the three territories asked the British government not to include them in the proposed union. This was agreed to, but provision for the possible eventual transfer of the administration of the territories was made in Section 151 of the South Africa Act

and the Schedule, where certain protective conditions are set out. As late as the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of June, 1956, the South African government continued to request the transfer of the three territories, but as international criticism of apartheid grew in volume, the realities of the situation must have been clear. South Africa had to make an adjustment first to the idea that the territories would not be incorporated and later to the fact that they were destined for independence.

"SYMBOLIC BATTLE LINE"

It has been said often enough that the most important political division in Africa is the line of boundaries which marks the southernmost march of African independence and divides it from the remaining areas of white rule. If this is so, then the "symbolic battle line" or the "moving edge of history," as one writer has described that line, now stretches into South Africa herself. What problems might an independent African state maintaining a non-racial society pose for an immediate neighbor maintaining a racially discriminatory economic, political, social and legal structure?

With this background in mind it may be easier to understand why some observers have seen in the logic of events the imminent collapse of the state structure in southern Africa, and an end to white minority rule and apartheid. But the logic of events is not history. At the beginning of the decade, it was the revolution within South Africa that appeared imminent. A decade later, stock should be taken more carefully. What changes have occurred in South Africa's situation since the early 1960's? To what extent is the republic still isolated at the United Nations and to what extent does this constitute a real threat to her security? How far have the events described posed serious problems in southern Africa and how successful has South Africa been in dealing with them? Has the Nationalist government been able to evolve any role for itself and with what measure of success? Let us turn to look first at the United Nations.

THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASES

As is well known, the International Court of Justice did not give judgment on the merits of the South-West Africa Cases. It did not pronounce upon any of the great racial and international issues which constituted the burden of the charges against South Africa. Instead, by a vote of eight to seven, the Court found in July, 1966, that the two applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia, had neither the legal right nor interest to advance their claims against South Africa and accordingly rejected them. This was in effect a reversal of the court's earlier judgment of 1962 when, by the same narrow margin of eight to seven, the court decided that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the cases. Much less was heard about the narrow margin on that occasion, although an appreciation of it is essential to an understanding of what happened in 1966. But the result was a resounding triumph—however unintended—for South Africa's Nationalist government, a vindication of South Africa's long insistence on the legal correctness of her case and conduct of it, and the removal of a great anxiety for most white South Africans.

The reaction at the United Nations must be judged by the General Assembly's resolution of October 27, 1966, in which it declared that South Africa's mandate was terminated, and set up a 14-nation committee to examine the practical means of establishing a United Nations administration. But Arthur Goldberg, the United States Ambassador, who said that this was an action proposal, also said it was a blueprint for peaceful action—which hardly sounded like a proposal to commit the United States or the United Nations to mandatory coercive measures. Ever since, the African states have sought to keep pressure on the Security Council to act to implement that resolution.

On March 20, 1969, in the Security Council debate on South-West Africa (Namibia), Lord Caradon, speaking for the United

Kingdom, said that his delegation considered that the original resolution was mistaken and that he did not want the council to adopt a course which would lead nowhere. He added that if it adopted resolutions about South-West Africa which it knew were ineffective and inoperative, it would only encourage South Africa to pursue her policies. Nevertheless, on August 12, 1969, the Security Council once more called on the government of South Africa to withdraw from South-West Africa immediately, but laid down October 4 as the deadline. The South African Foreign Minister has since handed in his government's refusal.

Thwarted over South-West Africa, and checked in the apartheid dispute, the African states have sought to involve South Africa and Portugal in the mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. At the same time, they have tried to obtain sterner measures against the Smith government. The Western powers in the Security Council have left no doubt that they do not intend to allow the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to be invoked nor to permit any steps that would lead to a serious confrontation.¹ The British representative made this clear in 1965 and again in June, 1969, when once more he explained the degree to which the British and South African economies were mutually dependent. Since Prime Minister Wilson earlier had made it equally clear that he intended no military action against Rhodesia, South African fears on that score were also set to rest. The United States understands and has supported the British position. Therefore, Western moves to keep up diplomatic pressure on South Africa are an embarrassment but not a threat and doubtless the Nationalist government has so regarded them. The issue over South-West Africa was not of this order, but that danger faded with the decision of the International Court on July 18, 1966.

In the Rhodesian crisis, South Africa's attitude has been cautious. In a speech on November 12, 1965, Verwoerd insisted that the dispute was essentially one between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, and made

¹ Chapter VII covers action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

no move to recognize the unilateral declaration. South Africa, he insisted, would refrain from comment or intervention, but would not in any circumstances join in sanctions against Rhodesia. Vorster has reiterated this position. As a result, South Africa has continued her trade with Rhodesia and has been an important factor—although not the only one—in lessening the impact of the United Nations sanctions. The only real danger for South Africa in the Rhodesian as in the Portuguese crisis lies in the possibility of involvement should either the Rhodesians or the Portuguese show the appearance of any weakness or partial breakdown under the strain of prolonged sanctions or increased guerrilla activity. To date this has not happened.

NINE FRIENDLY STATES

It is, however, in southern Africa and, in particular, in South Africa's relations with her neighbors that we see the most remarkable change of the decade. To be sure, when we come to look at the reasons, the change may seem less remarkable than inevitable, but this does not lessen its value to South Africa. Suddenly, or so it seemed, South Africa emerged as the center of a group of nine countries enjoying growing inter-state relationships and cooperation across racial lines. Four of those states, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi, are independent African states. These, with South Africa, South-West Africa, Rhodesia and Angola and Mozambique, make up the nine. Moreover, this cooperation has been reflected at the United Nations in the voting patterns of the four African states on the more extreme anti-South African resolutions.

From the 1950's on, Prime Ministers Johannes Strijdom and Verwoerd and Foreign Minister Louw all stressed South Africa's need to develop normal diplomatic relations in the course of time with the newly independent African states. But the opportunity was patently lacking. The hostility of the African states was too great. Nor is it clear that any really serious attention to the problems of diplomatic exchange was given until the

independence of the High Commission Territories in 1966. Two years later, Vorster's government welcomed an African diplomat as one of Malawi's resident representatives. Verwoerd had already welcomed the independence of the High Commission Territories and had invited Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho to visit him in Pretoria.

The establishment of friendly relations between Malawi and South Africa in 1966 was followed by the visit of three Malawian Cabinet ministers in March, 1967, and their entertainment by members of the South African cabinet. In September of the same year, Vorster announced that the governments of South Africa and Malawi would establish formal diplomatic relations and open legations in Blantyre and Pretoria.

There can be little doubt that the South African government had made certain decisions in the light of the forthcoming independence of the three territories. The government's willingness to accept the inevitable criticism of apartheid, to make special arrangements for the presence and prolonged visits of African diplomats or representatives, and warmly to welcome independence and cooperation are not altogether explained by the South African experience of Bantustans. The Nationalist government was obviously most anxious to break the monolithic anti-South African bloc in Africa and at the United Nations and to break out of the complete diplomatic isolation of which Louw had spoken in 1963. The forthcoming independence of the three territories not only provided a unique opportunity to begin but

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BOOK REVIEWS

Studies on Africa

By W. A. E. SKURNIK

Associate Professor of History, University of Colorado

THE GREAT POWERS AND AFRICA.

By WALDEMAR NIELSEN. (New York: Praeger, 1969. 404 pages, tables and index, \$11.95.)

This is one book for which students of Africa in world affairs have been waiting. Part I (180 pages) surveys the close relations between Europe and Africa; after an introduction reviewing major changes produced and met by African independence, there follow one chapter on pre- and post-independence policies of Britain, the same for France, for other West European nations, and for the Common Market. Part II (57 pages) reviews Soviet and Chinese policies toward Africa (two chapters). Part III is a review of United States policy toward Africa since World War II; it distinguishes between the Truman-Eisenhower and the Kennedy-Johnson periods. Part IV (67 pages) suggests guidelines for future United States policies and treats triangular (United States-Europe-Africa) relations, southern Africa, security policy, and the desirable United States contributions to African development.

Although it is too early to assess the potential attraction of communism in Africa, the record indicates that Russia has undergone a process of accommodation of her early ideological blinders to African realities; she has taken no major risk and diversified her economic and military assistance. Mainland China has played a minor role although her potential is far greater than past performance suggests.

American policy toward Africa is unsatisfactory. From the timidity of the Dwight Eisenhower administration to the

Johnson era, "a skillful holding action, or more accurately, retreat" in U.S. policy has reflected the usual mixture of idealism and pragmatism, and has been burdened by assumptions that Africa holds no vital strategic interest and hence must be subordinated to Europe. Future policy must lead to increasing American involvement because African needs are increasing; the author suggests that aloofness from the southern African caldron would lead to a race war, and that United States security policy should be guided by the principles of the Truman doctrine revised to suit new circumstances. The author closes with a gloomy note, but hopes that improvements in the nature of American domestic life will eventually provide the inspiration to revise policy toward Africa.

NOTES FROM AFRICA. By H. S. AYNOR. (New York: Praeger, 1969. 163 pages, \$5.95.)

This book, written by a distinguished Israeli diplomat, is to be enjoyed. Mr. Aynor is a humanist with a deep attachment to Africans, and his "notes" are stimulating. He uses such devices as imaginary cocktail parties and working sessions to uncover African problems, elite attitudes, and Western good will (the latter at times misplaced). He is an intellectual who has an aesthetic appreciation of culture and civilization and who asks and seeks to answer questions about social, economic, and psychological phenomena beneath the surface. One of the most interesting discussions refers to the colonially-induced differences between francophone

and anglophone Africans. His diplomatic reminiscences explode no sensational bomb (anyone who has talked to him in Africa knows that he knows more); but he manages to describe the influence of personal factors in foreign affairs by using factual examples couched in ostensibly apocryphal narrative. His counsel to students of Africa is to encourage Africans to seek their own solutions; the image of Africa which Aynor projects is that of mysterious forces resisting the inroads of modern technology, dehydrating dedicated technical assistants, and resisting alien visitors. His style is permeated with a touch of resigned sadness, and he suggests that African elites are often "undecided and leaderless," and that they have not yet succeeded in meshing virile traditions with the pinpricks of modernization.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER. By ZDENEK CERVENKA. (New York: Praeger, 1969. 230 pages, appendices and index, \$7.00.)

The author, a former civil servant in Ghana, has had access to primary sources about the O.A.U. and has produced a legal analysis of that organization; the present volume is an expanded version of the original published in Prague in 1968. The eight substantive chapters (in addition to a "prelude" and a "conclusion") recount the 1963 summit meetings, examine general provisions of the charter, the machinery for settling disputes, and the relation between the O.A.U. and the U.N. (ch. 5) as well as between the O.A.U. and African regional groups (ch. 7). In addition, chapter 6 discusses the case of Southwest Africa and its relations with the International Court of Justice, chapter 8 the Rhodesian Crisis, and chapter 9 the case of Nigeria. Of the three appendices, the Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration is a useful addition, whereas the other two (the charter and list of member states) have been published widely.

Political analysis—and material there-

for—is scanty, and judgments are hesitant. Some of the highlights include excerpts from 1963 speeches at Addis, the discussion of Nigeria (Dr. Cervenka points out that the future is likely to be determined by minorities), and the desirability and usefulness of African regional groups (he disagrees with Messrs. Nkrumah and Touré). The author concludes by suggesting that the O.A.U. is here to stay because it is needed by Africans.

FRANCE AND THE AFRICANS, 1944–1966. By EDWARD MORTIMER. (New York: Walker, 1969. 371 pages, maps and index, \$8.50.)

This book is written by a historian and journalist. It is based on careful and extensive research into French source materials and conversations with some main participants, and written in the vein of a French liberal committed to the Africans' cause. The author examines political developments and alignments in Africa against the background of events in France and singles out the many consequences of these events for political developments in Africa. It is the most detailed account available in English and thus an indispensable source for an understanding of politics in the pre-independence period in former French Africa.

Part I, entitled "The World's Rebirth," recounts the events surrounding the 1944 conference in Brazzaville, the formation of the French provisional government, and the first French constituent assembly. Part II, "The Cold War 1946–1950," traces the beginnings of the Africans' search for autonomy and reaction against a unitary colonial power. Part III continues the story toward increasing autonomy for the African territories. Part IV deals with Senegalese President Leopold S. Senghor's impatience. The book traces the developments from the 1956 French enabling act which strained the French constitution but allowed the African territories political, including executive, autonomy; through the failure of the African leaders to unite

to press joint demands; to the 1958 referendum which ushered in national independence. Finally, Part V briefly summarizes the mechanics of independence and the disintegration of the institutional African-French ensemble.

THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION, VOL. I: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXPLOSION 1950-1962. By JOHN MARCUM. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969. 349 pages, subject and name indices and appendices, \$12.50.)

This is probably the most important book written to date about the struggle of the Angolan freedom fighters to liberate their country from the yoke of Europe's most recalcitrant and unregenerate colonial power. Marcum has combed through massive evidence over a period of a decade; what lacunae his presentation may have are the result of the dearth of Portuguese primary sources and not of his lack of ability to assess what is available. The book begins with an account of the ethnic foundations of Angolan nationalism (Part I) among the Luanda-Mbundu, the Bakongo, and also chiefly among the Ovimbundu. Part II reviews the early "rebellion" which broke out in 1961. Part III brings the reader up to 1962, when the struggle changed into an incipient guerrilla war.

The author's treatment and understanding of the multifaceted relationships among numerous individual leaders, the various nationalist parties, the international (inter-African vis-à-vis extra-African) setting and Angola, and the leadership problems and ethnic undertones, give the book a sustained value quite apart from the insights which are based on his sympathies. The author concludes that the major nationalist movements, despite their frequent mutual hostility, at the end of 1962 were agreed that the effort to win the struggle must come chiefly from inside Angola and that it portended a protracted guerrilla war.

THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENT. By STANISLAV ANDRESKI. (New York: Atherton, 1969. 228 pages and index, \$6.95.)

This is a stimulating book written by the head of the Sociology Department at Reading University (England). Written for the initiate, it takes issue with many elements of present, conventional wisdom among students of Africa; it also casts a wide net by frequently drawing on data from outside Africa and hence contributes to clarification. The book is divided into 16 chapters whose titles (like "Television without Sanitation" or "The Shibboleth of Education") are reminiscent of the approach of René Dumont's in *False Start in Africa*, although Professor Andreski's platform is that of a conservative.

The author's chief concern is the eradication of poverty, which he attributes primarily to an endemic African system of government "by kleptocracy." The thesis is that the African "graduates" who call themselves elite man and hold the posts of political leadership in such a way as to guarantee the continued impoverishment of their compatriots. The solutions offered—such as winning the race between population increases and wealth, and a more pluralistic political system—can be found in the literature of the past 3 years. His discussion of the relative merits of democratic and authoritarian ways to lead Africa out of her predicament is a useful prod toward further thinking. The model he suggests for emulation is the Ivory Coast because it concentrates on economic development without the burden of ideological and other blinders.

AFRICAN ARMIES AND CIVIL ORDER. By J. M. LEE. (New York: Praeger, 1969). 185 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$6.00.)

Looking beyond the more or less unique features of military coups d'état in Africa, one important question concerns the ability of the military to make a contribution to the "development" of their countries. As
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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Lusaka Manifesto

At the fifth summit conference of East and Central African states, held in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 14–16, 1969, the Organization of African Unity issued a statement on Southern Africa known as the Lusaka Manifesto. Excerpts from the manifesto follow:

We, the leaders of East and Central African States meeting at Lusaka, 16 April 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto. . . .

We wish to make clear . . . our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organization.

On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognize that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals—without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination—there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world. . . .

It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

If the commitment to these principles existed among the states holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. . . .

[But] in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South

West Africa, and the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective administrations in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organizing their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the administrations of these states because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen. . . .

This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.

In *Mozambique* and *Angola*, and in so called *Portuguese Guinea*, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of

Africa into a constituent unit in a union which also includes a European state would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies. On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the peoples of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.

The peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea . . . are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the liberation movements to desist from their armed struggle and to cooperate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories. . . .

In *Rhodesia* the situation is different insofar as the metropolitan power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to re-assert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination. The matter cannot rest there. Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial power is unwilling or unable to effect such a transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as and when they can. And Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in Rhodesia is therefore whether Britain will re-assert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. Insofar as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will co-operate in her attempts to re-assert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer; it could involve less suffering for all the peoples of Rhodesia, both black and white. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means are open.

Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in *South West Africa* with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law, and by every precedent, South West Africa should have been now a sovereign, independent state with

a government based on majority rule. South West Africa was a German colony until 1919, just as Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi, Togoland and Cameroon were German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the mandatory system was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of South West Africa was given to the white minority Government of South Africa, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian or French governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except South West Africa was converted into a trusteeship territory and has subsequently gained independence. South Africa, on the other hand, has persistently refused to honour even the international obligation it accepted in 1919, and has increasingly applied to South West Africa the inhuman doctrines and organization of *apartheid*.

The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action, and in 1966 terminated the mandate under which South Africa had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of South Africa. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations, and set up an *ad hoc* committee to recommend practical means by which South West Africa would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self-determination and to achieve independence.

Nothing could be clearer than this decision, which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. South West Africa remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed, and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. . . .

The *Union of South Africa* is itself an independent, sovereign State and a member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet, the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.

There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The *apartheid* policy adopted and supported by its government is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position of privilege or the experience of oppression in the South African society depends on the one thing which it is beyond the power of any man to change. It depends upon a man's colour, his parentage and his ancestors. If you are black you cannot escape this categorisation, nor can you escape it if you are white. If you

are a black millionaire and a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws, and still excluded from political activity. If you are white, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation, will lead you only to the segregation and the comparative comfort of a white jail. Beliefs, abilities, and behavior are all irrelevant to a man's status; everything depends upon race. Manhood is irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. And the system is maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population and thus, inevitably of all. . . .

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WIND OF CHANGE

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posed problems to which such a policy was the only feasible answer.

What of the African neighbors? How much choice did Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland have when they became independent? The answer must be: very little. This underlines what is surely the major factor governing this group of states in southern Africa, namely, the central and dominant place of the South African economy. It is no exaggeration to maintain that the hold of the South African economy over the former High Commission Territories is nearly complete and, with regard to Rhodesia, Mozambique and Malawi, is large even disregarding for the moment the present special dependence of Rhodesia because of United Nations sanctions.

In the first place, three of them depend on the export of their labor to South Africa. For example, it would seem that only 5 per cent of Lesotho's total male labor force of about 265,000 can find employment in the country. At any time, about 164,000 are employed in the South African Republic. In addition, some 20,000-30,000 women are employed in South Africa. The annual remittances are estimated at Rand 5,400,000 in cash (Rand = \$1.40) and R2,000,000 in kind. Without this, Lesotho, a country of approximately one million inhabitants, could not survive. The aid from Britain for the

five years 1967-1972 is estimated at about R5,000,000 to R6,000,000. In 1967, Botswana, with a population of about 400,000, had some 32,000 to 33,000 men in South Africa working in the mines and some 8,000 other workers employed in domestic service there. Swaziland is not dependent on her export of labor but some 44 per cent of her land is worked under concessions and free hold and her mines and industries are dependent on South African capital.

Both Mozambique and Malawi export labor to Rhodesia and South Africa. Some 80,000 Malawians find employment in South Africa in mines served by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. According to the *Froneman Committee of Inquiry*, in September, 1960, there were some 836,000 foreign Africans in South Africa including women and dependents. On December 11, 1969, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland signed a new agreement continuing the 1910 customs union among them which was due to terminate after 60 years in 1970. This reminds us that they also have a common currency.

The conclusion is inescapable. The four African states are poor, landlocked and underdeveloped. They depend upon South Africa's good will. And this has been forthcoming from both government and private sources. Swaziland has concluded an agreement with the South African government according to which, upon request, South Africa will recruit, pay and equip South Africans to serve in Swaziland's local administration. South African engineers have been assisting in plans for the development of Swaziland's broadcasting services. In October, 1969, a South African parliamentary delegation led by the Speaker of the House of Assembly visited Malawi. This was the first such delegation to visit an independent African state. In addition to the loan towards the building of Malawi's new capital at Lilongwe, South African assistance is involved in the new railway line which will join the Portuguese line in Mozambique, thus providing Malawi with another outlet to the

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TANZANIA: COMMITMENT TO SELF-RELIANCE

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can Common Services Organization was established.

In mid-1963, new impetus was given to the East African Federation when Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Milton Obote of Uganda declared that their governments had agreed to its formation once Kenya secured independence. A University of East Africa was then inaugurated with Julius Nyerere as its first chancellor. However, in August, a key Uganda government figure declared that he was "not prepared to throw my country into darkness" and that he would oppose federation; at the same time, a Zanzibari spokesman observed that his country "was in no hurry" to join a federation. Plans to fashion close political ties were laid to rest in mid-1965.

As a partial substitute in the economic realm, an East African Community Treaty was signed on December 1, 1967, which strengthened the Common Services arrangement, particularly with regard to railways, harbors, telecommunications, airways and income tax collection. The treaty was finalized only after lengthy and extensive negotiations during which Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania accepted the need to subordinate a significant degree of their sovereignty and national aspirations for cooperative regional development. One of the principle objectives of the community is to produce a more equitable distribution of development and income throughout the region. To symbolize this, the community headquarters have been located in Arusha, Tanzania, rather than in one of the three national capitals. Headquarters for each of the community services have been apportioned to each country, thus bringing to an end the preeminence of Kenya, which played the leading role when the territories were under British tutelage.

A recent evaluation of the community's

performance was made by the United States Agency for International Development. It offered the following important observation:

All three countries have performed reasonably well in mobilizing financial resources for development, but all continue to face serious difficulties in planning and implementing development activities. The Community and its members are faced with major problems in rural/agricultural development, training and utilization of manpower, and expanding and improving Community services. While there are some differences in the nature of problems in the three countries, they are by and large associated with the need to diversify and expand commercial agricultural production, to reorder education to meet employment needs, and to strengthen and expand development oriented institutions and services.²

THE ARUSHA DECLARATION

Having decided to terminate profitless excursions into federalism, the Nyerere administration has opted for a program of national self-reliance. On February 5, 1967, President Nyerere announced the details of a national guidelines paper for political and economic development, later designated the Arusha Declaration, which sets national standards and goals. Emphasis is placed upon TANU as the vanguard of "socialist construction" in Tanzania. Within this new system, the leadership of the country will insure against self-interest and profiteering; "exploitation" is to be ended and the control of major means of production is to be placed in the hands of peasants and workers; the government will control foreign investment.

The government has since vigorously backed this new credo on socialism. Clearly, President Nyerere intends to have Tanzania come fully to grips with domestic problems, to avoid over-dependence upon external sources of aid, and to encourage a distribution of income which compels each and every Tanzanian to develop a stake in the future of his country. While this approach is regarded as utopian by some observers, and as a retreat into economic primitivism by others, it is more accurate to regard the Arusha Declaration as a realistic and courageous effort to overcome basic obstacles to economic growth through self-help.

² Agency for International Development, "U.S. Foreign Aid in Africa: Proposed Fiscal Year 1970 Program," (Washington, D. C.: 1969).

ELECTION YEAR POLITICS IN KENYA

(Continued from page 159)

critics by making them subject to collective responsibility.

Although the elections contributed to a lessening of tensions, they did not, of course, solve all Kenya's problems. Several flaws were revealed in the electoral system itself. The new system permitted voters wide latitude of choice but, for example, also permitted close to half of the constituency members to be elected with less than a majority. In one Nairobi constituency, the incumbent was returned from a 10-man field with under 23 per cent of the vote. More important, the system seemed irrelevant to the problem of choosing a successor to Kenyatta when the 80-year-old President steps down.

Kenya's most immediate problem is the reconciliation of the government and the people of Nyanza. Luos are unlikely to be pacified by the appointment of two Luo ministers. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any such reconciliation without Odinga in the government. In the past, opposition leaders have been co-opted into the government after joining KANU; in fact, Vice President Moi and four other current ministers were leaders in Kenya's two opposition parties at independence. It remains to be seen, however, whether the bitterness of 1969 has precluded such compromise in the case of Odinga.

NIGERIA AFTER BIAFRA

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in the caliber of government at the federal level, where good intentions are not complemented by a capacity for carrying them into execution. The federal Nigerian government will have to achieve new drive and dynamism if it is effectively to reintegrate the whole Ibo people, to assist with over-

coming the complex of postwar problems, to meet the challenge provided by the new state structure and to effect a transfer to representative civilian rule.

ZAMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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that after independence it would reduce the country's ties to the South. In keeping with this policy, Kaunda announced in the Legislative Council, in June, 1963, that his party intended to undertake and, if necessary, to pay for a feasibility study of a railway link between the Copperbelt and Dar es Salaam. With the approach of independence, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and individual Western governments were asked to help finance this project. But such aid was not forthcoming, because it was believed that the railway's economic prospects were very doubtful. Instead, the consultants favored and even offered to finance an all-weather tarmac road to replace the present road which, in the rainy season, becomes an impassable quagmire. (For this reason, it is popularly known as the Hell Run.) U.N.I.P. rejected this alternative plan because it regarded the railway primarily as a political project for anchoring Zambia to friendlier areas. Its view was (and still is) that like railways elsewhere, the Tanzania-Zambia (Tan-Zam) railway may not pay its way initially, but once operational, it will generate economic development along the route, which is over a thousand miles in length.

Having failed to obtain aid from their preferred source—the West—Zambia and Tanzania turned to the People's Republic of China. In 1967, China agreed to finance and construct the Tan-Zam railway, which is due to cost an estimated K200 million. For this project, China has offered an interest-free loan repayable by the purchase of Chinese goods. Zambia and Tanzania consider these terms to be attractive and reasonable. By the end of 1969, the surveying stage had been completed by some 600 Chinese engineers

and surveyors. Moreover, agreement had been reached on a number of technical points. For example, the railway gauges of Zambia and Tanzania differ in width. Instead of an expensive and time-wasting switching station at the border, the two countries have agreed to use the Zambian gauge of three feet and six inches over the whole length. Construction—mostly by Chinese technicians and laborers—is due to begin in 1970, with 1972 as the expected date of completion.

International reaction to the Tan-Zam railway has not been altogether favorable. In Western capitals observers initially expressed cynicism and doubt that the Chinese could execute such a project while their own railways were allegedly of inferior quality. Then, in 1969, rumors circulated that the Chinese planned to use wooden sleepers which, while cheaper to build, might be eaten by ants.

But by far the greatest concern has been expressed by the white ruled countries in Southern Africa, who see in this railway the thin end of the wedge. They fear that the Chinese will bring Zambia and Tanzania under their influence, and will use them not only to spread the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung but also to increase the level of guerrilla operations against them. For this reason, Prime Minister Balthazar J. Vorster of South Africa promised his party in September, 1968, that he would do his utmost to save Zambia from communism.²² It would not be surprising for Peking to gain Zambian good will as a result of this railway project. But to equate good will with subservience to or domination by China is to underrate the ability of Zambia and Tanzania to look after themselves.

There are likely to be two important effects of the Chinese role in this project. First, the transportation routes of Zambia and the pattern of her trade will change. China will probably become one of Zambia's major trading partners. Until 1969, Peking's trade with Zambia was insignificant and showed an unfavorable balance. In 1967, China's exports

to Zambia were worth K532,174 while imports stood at K6,255,628. The exports consisted mainly of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, food and chemicals. Since under the loan repayment terms Zambia has to purchase Chinese goods equal in value to the locally-incurred costs of construction, including salaries, this trade picture is certain to change in China's favor. In October, 1969, a Zambian trade mission visited Peking to study the range and quality of Chinese products. It returned satisfied on both points. Thus it seems certain that the railway project will boost China's foreign exchange earnings.

Second, Southern Africa—until now a Western and especially a British sphere of influence—is likely to feel deeply the presence of a great power hostile to the ruling groups in Southern Africa and capable of engineering their downfall. This situation, then, has the makings of a major Cold War confrontation on African soil.

PROSPECTS

Unlike foreign policies that support the status quo, revolutionary multi-faceted policies like Zambia's are difficult to predict. Nevertheless, two lines of possible development in Zambian foreign policy can be sketched.

The major unknown factor is how long Zambians will continue to be willing to sacrifice immediate benefits for future advantages. However, it is safe to predict that this will largely depend on Zambians' confidence in President Kaunda because of his integrity and the credibility of his policies and because of what they see as a fair distribution of the suffering involved. Should allegations of corruption in high places gain currency when (as now) the majority of the African population is on a belt-tightening program, then loss of support is very likely. But its form of expression is anyone's guess. In these days when (as Aristide Zolberg has aptly remarked) the military coup has become "the modal form of governmental and regime change" in Africa, even a coup cannot be discounted.

But far more likely is a second development

²² *Times of Zambia*, September 13, 1968. Some three weeks earlier, Vorster had appealed to Zambia to stop aiding guerrillas. *Sunday Express* (Johannesburg), August 25, 1968.

—namely, the use of all forms of diplomatic pressure and informal penetration by the Southern African minority regimes. It is in their interest to change Zambia's present attitude toward them and to stop her turn toward East Africa.

The question which will preoccupy observers of Zambian foreign policy is what imaginative moves the government can be expected to make toward reaching an understanding with the South in the face of the latter's intransigence and its diplomatic offensive in Africa. This is spearheaded by South Africa through her "outward-looking" foreign policy. Already, there are two indications. In December, 1969, Kaunda broadcast a clear rejection of South African overtures and a sharp criticism of Pretoria's supporters.²³ Yet at the same time the Lusaka Manifesto is a signal of his country's willingness to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the South.

The Zambezi region has thus emerged as an area of conflict between white-ruled Southern Africa and independent black Africa, with Zambia in the frontline.²⁴ The next moves by the U.N.I.P. government will influence not only the direction of developments in Zambia, but the nature and the pace of the movement for liberating the southern tip of the continent.

²³ For the text, see *Background No. 90/69*, December 11, 1969 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services).

²⁴ For a good presentation of the South's strategic designs on Zambia, see Hall, *op. cit.*, especially chapters 1-4 and 16-17.

STORM CLOUDS OVER THE HORN

(Continued from page 147)

common sense and the more positive aspirations of mankind work in favor of a peaceful accommodation. Underlying all is the growing realization that a gigantic political fracture zone is developing on the African continent, running westward from the Red Sea to Chad and perhaps, even, eventually to the Atlantic Ocean, somewhere on the coast between Mauretania and Senegal.

Patience, tolerance and diplomacy will be required to grapple with the implications of this fact, and to work towards the extensive political adjustments that its recognition will entail.

INDEPENDENT RHODESIA

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In the four years that have since passed, British envoys have gone to Salisbury on a number of occasions for fruitless discussions. The two major attempts at a negotiated settlement, however, have been the face-to-face meetings of Wilson and Smith, both on British warships in the Mediterranean—on board the *Tiger*, December 2-3, 1966, and on board the *Fearless*, October 9-13, 1968. The location of these talks may have been a not-too-subtle attempt at psychological pressure. Nevertheless, the fact that they were held at all meant that Wilson was being obliged to treat Smith with more respect than the official fulminations about "rebellion" made appropriate. After all, Lord North did not invite George Washington to have a chat on a British warship about a compromise settlement of colonial grievances. Lincoln did not invite Jefferson Davis to Washington in the spring of 1861 to patch up an arrangement to maintain the Union.

The main stumbling-block in all such discussions has been the British insistence that there be rapid progress toward majority rule in Rhodesia, and the Salisbury government's desire to go on doing what it has been doing all along, that is, controlling the pace and nature of such advance.

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS

The Wilson government immensely complicated the Rhodesia issue by making it first a Commonwealth and then a United Nations issue. The United Nations had indeed attempted to assert an interest in the matter earlier. But from 1962 to 1965 British governments—of both parties—had consistently asserted that Rhodesia had been self-governing since 1923, and was not a "non-self-gov-

erning" territory within the terms of the Charter, and that therefore the United Nations was not competent to discuss her affairs. Obviously, a solution now would be easier to achieve if the British had held to this view rather than permitting 125 other parties to join in the discussion. The British decision to take the question to the United Nations was the result of frustrations (since the first policy had failed) and of Commonwealth pressure at the Commonwealth conference in September, 1966. After the *Tiger* meeting, at the request of Britain the U.N. Security Council invoked economic sanctions against Rhodesia on December 16, 1966. This was the first vote for such sanctions in U.N. history. Further steps were the Security Council authorization of April 9, 1967, to Britain to use force to prevent oil deliveries to the Portuguese port of Beira; and the imposition of "comprehensive, mandatory sanctions" on May 29, 1968.

THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

The effect of these measures so far has been less than was expected. South Africa, Portugal and Malawi, among Rhodesia's neighbors, have all refused to enforce sanctions. In Europe, West Germany and Switzerland (neither U.N. members) have complied imperfectly. It cannot be doubted that there has been widespread evasion by citizens of countries which are in theory complying. Despite sanctions, oil has never been a problem for Rhodesia: it is imported through South Africa. The main effect on Rhodesia has been restrictions on the tobacco industry. Markets have sharply dwindled and much tobacco remains unsold. This has forced a diversification of Rhodesian agriculture and industry which will probably be salutary in the long run.

That British and U.N. policy has had some

effect is of course beyond question. Independent Rhodesia has not been officially recognized by any other state; not even by Portugal or South Africa, which would undoubtedly like to see an early settlement of the issue. Assessing the damage to the Rhodesian economy is difficult. The government has enacted stringent measures against releasing information that would create despondency. Rhodesian trade with the United States, Britain and France has dwindled to a trickle, but it seems likely that many new channels have been opened. Goods, including all kinds of sophisticated imports, are not in short supply in Salisbury. A respected authority reported on November 10, 1969:

By and large, . . . [Rhodesia] has never enjoyed greater prosperity. Industrial production last year increased by 5%, while consumption of electricity rose 15%. Compared with \$986 million in 1965, the year of independence, gross national product in 1969 will reach an estimated \$1.2 billion, up 10% from 1968. In foreign exchange markets the Rhodesian pound (still valued at \$2.80, by the way) is firm, while local stocks have boomed. Foreign goods, supposedly banned by the U.N. resolution, are plentiful. . . .⁷

The impact of sanctions has in fact fallen on some unforeseen (but not unforeseeable) victims. Within Rhodesia the only segment of the population to be hurt as unemployment increased has been the black majority. Outside, Rhodesia's neighbor Zambia (the former Northern Rhodesia) has suffered severe loss and inconvenience. The United Kingdom, according to an official statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, from November, 1965, to May, 1969, suffered *direct* losses as a result of the sanctions policy of £37.7 (\$90.5) million. The total cost was undoubtedly much higher. The United States has shut itself off from its normal supply of high-grade chromium, an essential metal for which it has now become entirely dependent on imports from the Soviet Union—at much higher prices.

As the sanctions policy has failed to produce the desired results, the tendency of Britain and the United Nations, concurred in by the United States,⁸ has been to carry it out more stringently, and supporters of the

⁷ *Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly*, November 10, 1969.

⁸ President Richard Nixon, however, has kept open on a minimal basis the U.S. Consulate in Salisbury. It is of some interest that no public opinion poll has ever attempted to assess whether Americans approve United States policy in Rhodesia. One suspects that the great majority are unaware what United States policy there is.

policy apparently look forward with some enthusiasm to ever more vigorous attempts to coerce South Africa and Portugal.⁹

The case on the other side, however, though it has received very little publicity, is a weighty one. It has been argued persuasively, and wittily, by Dean Acheson and also by Charles Burton Marshall.¹⁰ The main point of their argument is that the basis of U.N. action is a "determination" that the Rhodesian question constitutes "a threat to the peace" (the phrase is from Article 39 of the Charter, and justifies the use of sanctions and even force), and that this "determination" is patently absurd. This section of the Charter was framed to provide ways of dealing with aggression, and there has been no aggression. The threat to the peace is not from Rhodesia, which has threatened no one and only wishes to be left alone, but to Rhodesia from other states which dislike Rhodesian domestic policy and which have mounted attacks (so far ineffectively) against her borders; attacks never rebuked by the Security Council.

This, then, is the situation of Rhodesia at present. Speculation naturally turns to possible developments. Here all is guesswork. The Rhodesian situation has not altered in its essential features for a number of years.

There are no indications of substantive change in the near future. "British policy in Rhodesia has failed," wrote Frederic Hunter, the knowledgeable correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*,¹¹ but since

politicians never admit mistakes, there is no prospect of a policy change by Harold Wilson. A Conservative victory in the general election due before spring, 1971, might produce a modification. There is no organized native resistance within Rhodesia. There is no disorder in Rhodesia. The various alphabetic resistance groups now based outside Rhodesia exist mainly on paper. The attempt to infiltrate guerrillas into Rhodesia has so far been unsuccessful. The international sanctions policy has done more damage to Rhodesia's opponents than to Rhodesia. All in all, therefore, one may look for the present situation to persist in its essentials for a long time to come.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 172)

other observers have suggested, Professor Lee concludes that they do not. The handicaps of military regimes in Africa may be explained in part by their own motivations and background, such as their expectations about the rationality of politics. The author believes that the societies in which they operate are even more important in explaining their lack of success. The societies encased in new political frontiers are weak, and have developed neither effective institutions nor widely accepted concepts about national goals or procedures for conflict resolution. Governments have been concerned chiefly with the allocation of material rewards to contending factions, whereas the military are preoccupied more with administration and law and order.

The material is presented in 7 chapters. Following an introduction defining major African social problems, three chapters explore the colonial background, independence, and aspects of the military in the new states. The author then examines the search for new functions and elements in the behavior of the armed forces. The book is enhanced by thorough research.

⁹ One who has no doubts is Ralph Zacklin; see his *Challenge of Rhodesia: Toward an International Public Policy* (Carnegie, November 1969). The case for the legality of the U.N. sanctions policy is argued by M. S. McDougal and Y. M. Reisman in "Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern," *American Journal of International Law*, January, 1968, pp. 1-19. Those who already agree with the conclusions will no doubt find the argument convincing.

¹⁰ C. B. Marshall, *Crisis over Rhodesia: A Skeptical View* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). A number of addresses and statements by Dean Acheson have been collected under the title *Dean Acheson on the Rhodesian Question* and published by the Rhodesian Information Office, 2852 McGill Terrace N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

¹¹ Frederic Hunter, "Rhodesia: Will Black Africans ever Rule?" *Christian Science Monitor*, June 14, 1969.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of January, 1970, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 9—Britain receives assurances from 5 of the 6 other members of the Western European Union that no binding political decisions will be made by the European Common Market before negotiations are begun for the entry of Britain. France gives no such assurance. The 5—West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—are also members of the Common Market.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *France*)

Jan. 1—Jordan announces that in a series of air raids Israel has knocked out the East Ghor Canal for the third time since June, 1969.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Israel Galili, Minister of Information, issue a strong warning to Lebanon to restrict the activities of Arab guerrillas operating against Israel from Lebanon.

Jan. 3—It is revealed that last week Israeli commandos removed a 7-ton radar installation from the U.A.R. to Israeli-occupied Sinai. The Soviet-built base was removed by freight-carrying helicopters.

Jan. 4—In the wake of an Israeli reprisal raid into Lebanon yesterday, Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon's Minister of Public Works, asks the Arab commandos to vacate Lebanese soil because "this presence threatens to bring destruction to Lebanon."

Jan. 8—Following a 2-hour meeting with commandos, Interior Minister Kamal Jumblatt of Lebanon announces that a new agreement has been reached. Guerrillas have agreed to refrain from shooting across the border into Israel.

Jan. 11—Israel declares that the return of the 18 remaining Lebanese prisoners captured on January 3 depends on the release of one Israeli watchman.

Jan. 12—The Lebanese government announces a new policy for the defense of border villages: villagers are to be provided with arms and trained by the army; emergency medical supplies will also be provided.

Jan. 15—Lebanese Minister of the Interior Jumblatt orders commando representatives to vacate 2 towns in southern Lebanon following demonstrations against the commandos by townspeople.

Jan. 19—Following a meeting with Yasir Arafat, the commando leader, Lebanese Interior Minister Jumblatt states that "Commandos have agreed that responsibility for law and order in the refugee camps is that of the Lebanese authorities." The 15 refugee camps in Lebanon have been under the control of Palestinian commandos since October, 1969.

Jan. 21—In what Israeli reports claim to be the largest ground operation since June, 1967, an Israeli attack is staged against Arab commandos in Jordan south of the Dead Sea.

Jan. 22—The Egyptian island of Shadwan at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez is captured following a 6-hour battle.

Jan. 23—Israeli sources say that all installations on the Egyptian island of Shadwan have been destroyed and that all equipment, including a radar unit, has been removed by Israeli forces.

Jan. 29—In the first enemy incursion of its kind since the 1967 war, a Syrian MIG-21 flies low over Haifa; Israeli planes then fly deep into Syrian territory to prove their range.

United Nations

Jan. 19—After a day in Nigeria, Secretary General U Thant states that there is no evidence of mistreatment of Biafra's civilian population. Thant has not visited the former Biafran areas.

Jan. 30—The Security Council votes 13 to 0 with Britain and France abstaining to condemn South Africa's "illegal presence" in South-West Africa.

War in Vietnam

Jan. 2—U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew concludes a 24-hour visit to Vietnam.

Jan. 3—The U.S. military command reports a North Vietnamese attack on a U.S. field camp near Ducpho.

Jan. 5—The U.S. command in Vietnam begins its second investigation in 4 months into charges of censorship and distortion of news on the military radio and television networks in Vietnam.

Jan. 6—Allied officials estimate that North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam during 1969 totaled 100,000 to 110,000 men; this is 30,000 to 40,000 fewer infiltrators than were reported in 1968.

Jan. 8—Philip C. Habib, the acting chief of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks, proposes "restricted" sessions of the peace talks; the offer of private talks is rejected by the North Vietnamese.

2 more U.S. soldiers are charged in connection with the alleged Songmy massacre.

Jan. 9—President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam says in a news conference that it will be impossible and impractical to withdraw all U.S. combat troops from South Vietnam in 1970. Thieu states that further U.S. troop withdrawals will depend on the adequate equipping of South Vietnam with supplies and funds by the U.S.

Jan. 12—The U.S. military command announces that the First Infantry Division will be the major combat element to leave Vietnam in the third phase of President Richard Nixon's troop withdrawal.

Jan. 17—South Vietnamese military headquarters announces the replacement of 2 military commanders in the Mekong Delta and 14 province chiefs.

Jan. 18—3 more South Vietnamese commanding generals are shifted; 4 provincial chiefs are replaced.

Jan. 20—The U.S. command says that an investigation conducted by the Inspector General's office concerning alleged censorship of news broadcasts to servicemen in the war zone has found no violation of Defense Department policies.

Jan. 21—U.S. sources report 3 sharp jungle clashes north and northwest of Saigon.

Jan. 30—An antiaircraft missile base inside North Vietnam is hit by U.S. bombers after a U.S. reconnaissance plane was fired on.

AFGHANISTAN

Jan. 6—U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew stops in Kabul on his 11-nation Asian tour. Student demonstrators protest his visit.

ALBANIA

Jan. 20—A new trade and financial agreement is signed between Albania and Communist China.

AUSTRALIA

Jan. 13—Visiting the Pacific area, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew tells Australians that "despite a great deal of speculation and rumor, we are not withdrawing from Asia and the Pacific."

Jan. 14—The government reports that coastal defenses in the Indian Ocean are being strengthened in response to a growing Soviet naval presence.

BRAZIL

Jan. 10—The government abandons plans to develop buildings for a 1972 world's fair; it will use the money for expansion of the university campus in Rio de Janeiro. The 2-month-old government of Emilio Garrazazu Médici puts priority on plans for agriculture, health, education and technical development.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 4—*Hsinhua*, the official news agency, charges the U.S.S.R. with talking peace but preparing for war.

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)

Jan. 3—U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew, in Taiwan, tells President Chiang Kai-shek that the U.S. will seek "meaningful dialogue" with Communist China.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jan. 1—President Ludvik Svoboda broadcasts New Year's greetings, urging "a sensitive approach to people." This is interpreted as a plea for moderation following Communist party announcements of planned extensive new purges.

Jan. 5—Communist leader Gustav Husak criticizes ultraconservatives who seek to return the country to the harsh restrictive period before 1968.

Jan. 12—The State Interior Ministry announces that it has uncovered a Trotskyite plot aimed at overthrowing the existing political system.

Jan. 14—The Communist party newspaper *Rude Pravo* publishes an attack on Alexander Dubcek, party leader during the liberal period of 1968. Dubcek, who was appointed Ambassador to Turkey after losing his official posts in Czechoslovakia, has not yet taken his new post.

Jan. 25—Dubcek leaves Prague for Turkey to assume the post of Ambassador.

Jan. 28—The Communist party central committee removes Oldrich Cernik as Premier, replacing him with Lubomir Strougal. The committee "accepts the resignation" of Alexander Dubcek, former party leader who is now Ambassador to Turkey.

EL SALVADOR

Jan. 26—Delegates from El Salvador and Honduras meet in Costa Rica to begin

peace negotiations. José Antonio Mora of Uruguay will act as mediator.

Jan. 29—Fighting breaks out again on the border between Honduras and El Salvador.

FRANCE

Jan. 7—The government reveals that it has concluded an arms deal and commercial agreement with Libya; it will supply 50 *Mirage* fighter-bombers. (France has embargoed the *Mirage* planes originally built for Israel.)

Jan. 21—An additional 50 *Mirage* planes will be supplied to Libya, according to a brief government announcement.

Jan. 27—In the face of growing criticism of the sale of *Mirage* jets to Libya, Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas says France will embargo the remaining deliveries if any of the planes appear on the Arab-Israeli war front. Critics charge that Libya does not have the pilots to fly the planes and that the sale was concluded with the assistance of U.A.R. agents.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Jan. 19—Communist party leader Walter Ulbricht voices tentative agreement to the opening of negotiations between the two Germanies and declares he sets no preconditions for the talks. (See also *West Germany*.)

Jan. 24—East German disapproval of parliamentary meetings held in West Berlin by the West German government results in East German harassment of traffic into West Berlin.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Jan. 14—Chancellor Willy Brandt urges the opening of talks between East and West Germany seeking a "regulated relationship." (See also *East Germany*.)

Jan. 19—Chancellor Brandt announces that he is drafting proposals for discussions between East and West Germany.

Jan. 31—Two days of talks between Brandt and French President Georges Pompidou end; German sources report French support for West Germany's Soviet bloc policy.

HONDURAS

(See *El Salvador*)

INDIA

Jan. 30—Widespread rioting continues in Haryana State after the government awards the disputed city of Chandigarh to Punjab State; a 3-year struggle for possession of the city by the rival states ends.

INDONESIA

Jan. 11—U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew talks with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, then goes to Bali for a 2-day rest during his 11-nation Asian tour.

IRAQ

Jan. 21—The government announces the smashing of a plot to overthrow the government. A special court is set up to try the plotters. 16 Iraqis are executed.

Jan. 22—11 Iraqis are executed in the continuing purge. Another 7, sentenced 2 months ago on charges of spying, are also executed.

Jan. 24—Execution of another 3 accused plotters brings to 44 the number executed since January 21.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Jan. 29—The Cabinet reverses a High Court ruling which permitted a person to register as a Jew without meeting religious criteria.

JAPAN

Jan. 14—Parliament reelects Eisaku Sato as Premier. Sato appoints a Cabinet of pro-U.S. ministers.

Jan. 20—A 5-day strike is begun by 7,000 Okinawan workers on U.S. military bases. They are protesting the terms of layoffs

caused by the cut in U.S. defense spending.

Jan. 24—The Finance Ministry presents a draft of the 1970 budget. Military spending is to be increased sharply and aid to developing countries is to be increased somewhat.

KENYA

Jan. 10—The government orders some 1,000 Asian traders to close their businesses by June, 1970.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Jan. 7—Major General Emile Bustani is removed as commander in chief of the armed forces and replaced by Major General Jean Njaim. Njaim is expected to be firmer with both Israel and the Palestinian comandos.

Jan. 9—Christian Belon, a young Frenchman, hijacks a Trans World Airlines jet to Lebanon.

Jan. 14—Belon is freed on \$8 bail by a Lebanese government official.

Jan. 23—A high court orders the rearrest of Belon on charges that he restricted the freedom of passengers on the plane he hijacked January 9.

LESOTHO

Jan. 30—Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan declares a state of emergency and arrests Congress party leader Ntsu Mokhehle, his chief political opponent, after Mokhehle says he expects to win the general election which began on January 27.

Jan. 31—Jonathan invalidates the January 27 election and seizes power.

LIBYA

(See also *France*)

Jan. 15—Premier Mahmoud Soliman al-Maghreby resigns. He has headed the junta which has controlled the government since the coup on September 1, 1969.

Jan. 16—The leader of the Revolutionary

Command Council, Muammar el-Qaddafi, assumes the post of Premier. He also becomes Defense Minister and appoints 4 other military officers as members of the 12-man Cabinet.

MEXICO

Jan. 18—A 40-day hunger strike by imprisoned student leaders is ended after the government fails to heed their pleas for release on bail or for prompt trial. The students have been in prison since the summer of 1968.

NIGERIA

Jan. 11—Nigerian troops put Biafra's last airstrip out of action and advance on the Biafran provisional capital of Owerri. Biafran leader Odumegwu Ojukwu leaves Biafra with his family for an undisclosed country.

Jan. 13—Brigadier Philip Effiong, who took over Biafran leadership after the flight of Ojukwu, announces the surrender of Biafra. Nigerian government leader Yakubu Gowon accepts the surrender in "good faith."

Jan. 14—Effiong declares that Biafra accepts the structure of federation and pledges loyalty to the federal government.

Jan. 26—In a continuing debate over the adequacy of relief to former Biafrans by the federal Nigerian Red Cross, U.N. observer Saiduddin Khan says there is "obviously not enough" relief. A major effort by many agencies for a long period will be required, he estimates. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

PAKISTAN

Jan. 3—President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan lifts the restriction on political activity which has been in effect since March 25, 1969.

PHILIPPINES

Jan. 26—Mass demonstrations by 20,000 students, farmers and laborers confront

President Ferdinand Marcos as he leaves the Congress building after delivering his State of the Nation address. The demonstrators are demanding an end to corruption.

Jan. 31—When 2,000 students and young people storm the presidential palace, 2 students are killed and 102 are wounded by gunfire. The demonstrators are continuing to charge fraud in the elections of November 11, 1969, in which Ferdinand Marcos was reelected.

SINGAPORE

Jan. 9—U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew, in Singapore on his 11-nation Asian tour, says the U.S. will extend some types of technical aid to Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand to help fill the defense gap when Great Britain pulls her forces out of the region in 1971.

U.S.S.R.

Jan. 6—The Communist party newspaper *Pravda* resumes harsh criticism of Communist China.

Jan. 9—The government newspaper *Izvestia* continues its anti-Chinese attacks as it reports the planned resumption of U.S.-Chinese talks.

Jan. 13—Border talks between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are resumed in Peking.

The government reports that it takes a "favorable" attitude toward U.S. participation in a proposed all-European conference.

Jan. 16—*The New York Times* reports that a speech made last month by party leader Leonid Brezhnev to the party's Central Committee described serious difficulties in the Soviet economy.

Jan. 29—At the close of a plenary meeting of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Politbureau member and trade union head Aleksandr Shelepin says the unions must "strengthen the struggle" against "absenteeism, loafing and drunkenness."

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Jan. 1—The government abolishes the annual \$250 limit on funds Britons can spend traveling outside the country.

Jan. 2—The Treasury announces a \$24-million increase in its gold reserves in December, 1969. Reserves, now calculated at \$2.52 billion, rose for 10 of the 12 months of 1969. A foreign trade surplus for the 3d straight month is also announced.

Jan. 28—Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in Washington for discussions with U.S. leaders. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

Northern Ireland

Jan. 29—Sales of liquor and parades are banned in Belfast following renewed strife between Protestants and Catholics.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights and Race Relations

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Jan. 3—Governor John Williams of Mississippi says that he will ask the legislature to seek ways to foster the establishment of private schools. Court-ordered desegregation is scheduled to begin in many Mississippi schools next week.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare releases figures for the fall of 1968 that show that 61 per cent of the nation's Negro students and 65.6 per cent of the whites still attend largely segregated schools.

Jan. 5—3 of the Mississippi school districts that are under orders to desegregate immediately reopen. Some white students attend classes. No violence is reported.

Jan. 7—The Department of Health, Education and Welfare announces the restoration of the eligibility of Georgia school districts to receive federal funds; the funds were cut off because of the failure of the school districts to desegregate their schools;

they are now under court order to do so. The Department notifies 9 other Southern school districts that it is taking formal action that could lead to the cut-off of federal funds as a result of their failure to desegregate.

Jan. 8—Aaron E. Henry, president of the Mississippi chapter of the NAACP, charges racial discrimination by state agencies and the Red Cross during relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Camille last fall.

Jan. 10—The Justice Department announces that almost 80 per cent of the Negro and white students who were expected to do so have enrolled in the 13 desegregated school districts in Mississippi. 17 school districts have not yet reopened after the Christmas vacation.

As the Atlanta, Georgia, school board perfects plans for the student and faculty desegregation to be presented to the U.S. district court, Governor Lester G. Maddox calls on the state legislature to abolish the state's compulsory school attendance law.

Jan. 12—After months of negotiations, an agreement is reached in Chicago between leaders of the black community and union and construction industry officials to train Negroes in skilled construction industry jobs. The plan is expected to open 4,000 jobs in the building trades to Negroes.

U.S. District Court Judge Frank Hooper announces that he will delay until March 5 the latest desegregation plan for the city of Atlanta.

Jan. 13—A 3-judge federal district court orders the Internal Revenue Service to stop granting tax-exempt status to segregated new private schools in Mississippi. The ruling will not affect schools which already have tax-exempt status or schools accepting Negro students.

Mississippi Governor Williams asks the state legislature to provide tax relief for the patrons of private, racially segregated schools.

Jan. 15—Meetings and services are held across the nation in memory of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Jan. 20—In the first case to enforce desegregation brought to trial by the federal government against a northern school district, a federal district court judge orders the Pasadena, California, school district to submit plans for desegregation by February 16; the plan would go into effect in September, 1970.

Jan. 27—South Carolina Governor Robert McNair tells a state-wide television audience that he will comply with federal court orders to desegregate the public schools.

Jan. 30—A Cook County (Chicago) grand jury indicts 7 Black Panthers for attempted murder in connection with a predawn police raid in December, 1969.

Economy

Jan. 9—The Labor Department reports an unemployment rate of 3.4 per cent for December, 1969.

Jan. 15—The Commerce Department issues preliminary estimates that show that the "real" Gross National Product, after eliminating the effects of higher prices, remained virtually the same for the fourth quarter of 1969 as for the third. This is one of the first indications of the economic slowdown sought by government policy. Consumer prices continue to rise.

Jan. 16—The Commerce Department reports that personal income in December, 1969, rose by the smallest amount of any month in 1969 and that housing starts declined in December to the lowest level of 1969. The Federal Reserve Board reports that industrial production fell in December for the fifth consecutive month.

Bethlehem Steel Corporation announces a price rise of about 5 per cent on steel used in the construction of commercial and industrial buildings, ships, bridges and heavy machinery facilities.

Jan. 19—Consumer prices rose 0.6 per cent in December, 1969, bringing the increase from December, 1968, to 6.1 per cent.

Jan. 20—The Federal Reserve Board announces increases in the interest rates com-

mercial banks can pay to "consumer type" savers and large corporation depositors. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announces similar increases in the ceilings on interest rates for savings banks.

Jan. 21—The U.S. Steel Corporation announces price increases averaging 4.6 per cent; other steel producers announce similar price increases.

Foreign Policy

Jan. 2—President Richard Nixon says he has ordered tariffs cut from 40 per cent to 21 per cent on several kinds of rugs; most of the imports affected come from Common Market countries.

Jan. 9—The administration confirms that the U.S. has agreed to give the government of Nationalist China a squadron of F-104 Starfighter Jets from "excess" Air Force stocks.

Jan. 12—The President authorizes the allocation of an extra \$10 million in food and medicine for Biafran relief and informs Nigerian President Yakubu Gowon of the U.S. readiness to assist Nigeria.

Jan. 19—Vice President Spiro Agnew returns to Washington after a 37,000-mile trip to 11 Asian nations.

Jan. 20—Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson declares that the U.S. should not reduce its troop strength in Europe. His statement is made in response to a resolution introduced in the Senate by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana calling for a substantial reduction in the 310,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in Europe.

The U.S. and Communist China reopen formal ambassadorial talks; the opening conference is the 135th in a series of discussions that began in 1958 and were suspended 2 years ago.

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard announces that the U.S. and West Germany have decided to end a 7-year joint development plan for a futuristic tank.

Jan. 22—In Washington, a heavily censored

version of the December 15, 1969, Senate session on Laos is released.

The White House reveals that the Nigerian government has urgently requested aid for the former territory of Biafra.

Jan. 25—The President assures an emergency conference of Jewish leaders meeting in Washington, D.C., that the U.S. is "prepared to supply military equipment necessary to support the efforts of friendly governments, like Israel's, to defend the safety of their people."

Jan. 27—Diplomatic sources at the U.N. report that the U.S. has told the governments of the Arab states that President Nixon's remarks of January 25 to U.S. Jewish leaders do not indicate a U.S. decision to grant Israeli requests for further U.S. aid.

Jan. 28—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson takes part in a meeting of the National Security Council, in the course of a 2-day visit.

Jan. 30—President Nixon tells a televised news conference that he will decide within a month whether or not to send additional arms to Israel.

Jan. 31—The Civil Aeronautics Board rules that the nation's largest airlines must cut their domestic air fares 6.35 per cent.

Government

Jan. 1—President Nixon signs a law establishing a 3-man Council on Environmental Quality and promises a "now or never" fight against pollution.

Jan. 5—Secretary Robert Finch of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare learns that the loyalty oath required of federal employees was discontinued as of September 29, 1969; disclosure of its abolition follows publication January 2 of HEW's new guidelines for hiring part-time employees without security clearance checks. The Civil Service Commission's directive advising that the loyalty oath is no longer required has not been widely publicized; thousands of new employees have signed the oath although they should not have been required to do so.

Jan. 7—Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin extends the federal food stamp program to 31 communities for the first time; 180 other areas are authorized to switch from food distribution plans to food stamps. The department estimates that some 900,000 people may benefit from the extension of the stamp program.

Jan. 8—Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney discloses that HUD has instituted an "across the board" cutback in urban renewal grants in 50 or 60 cities. Many cities regarded the amendatory grants as firm commitments.

Jan. 11—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird declares that the administration proposes gradually to eliminate student and occupational draft deferments; the policy will not be retroactive.

Jan. 12—U.S. Attorney Robert Morgenthau announces that Dr. Martin Sweig, suspended administrative assistant to John W. McCormack (speaker of the House of Representatives), and lobbyist Nathan Voloshen have been indicted on charges of defrauding federal agencies.

Jan. 15—The Federal Communications Commission announces that it will not entertain license challenges against television and radio stations that are "substantially" meeting their communities' programming needs. Legislation pending in Congress would forbid any competitive license applications. Under current legislation, licenses must be renewed every 3 years.

The Securities and Exchange Commission approves the National Corporation for Housing Partnership, which intends to establish almost \$2 billion in new, privately built lower income housing. The S.E.C. has accepted the registration of N.C.H.P. securities.

Jan. 19—The Food and Drug Administration sends letters to 381,000 doctors and hospital administrators urging that patients be told about the potential hazards in the use of contraceptive pills.

From the time President Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act on December 29, 1969, to January 16,

1970, 45,209 persons in 32 states have applied for disability payments for black lung disease, according to a report from the Social Security Administration made public today.

The second session of the 91st Congress convenes.

Jan. 20—The President welcomes returning Vice President Spiro Agnew and says that he plans to offer Congress a "State of the World" message about 2 weeks after his State of the Union message.

The Senate votes 74 to 17 to endorse the \$19.7-billion health and education appropriation bill, which passed the House in the first session of the 91st Congress. The President has threatened to veto the bill.

Senator George McGovern (D., South Dakota) attacks President Nixon's welfare proposals and suggests a family allowance plan; he also urges a guaranteed job at a decent wage for every citizen able to work and increased Social Security benefits.

Jan. 22—President Nixon delivers his first State of the Union message to Congress; the President suggests a 5-year, \$10-billion program partly financed by the federal government to alleviate water pollution plus other measures to end the contamination of the environment; welfare and tax reform; strong anti-crime legislation; an effort to combat inflation; and the development of a "national growth policy."

Jan. 23—The Senate approves a revision of federal criminal law by a vote of 73 to 1; the bill, which provides new tools to fight organized crime including "no-knock" provisions, goes to the House.

In a policy memorandum to the Federal Communications Commission, the White House declares that domestic communications satellites should be developed by private interests, denying the request of Comsat (the government-chartered Communications Satellite Corporation) that it be the only authorized satellite company.

Jan. 22—The Department of Health, Education and Welfare places color television

sets, microwave ovens, sun lamps and other electronic devices that emit radiation under the regulation of the Bureau of Radiological Health.

Jan. 26—In a televised ceremony, the President vetoes the \$19.7-billion appropriation for health, antipoverty and education programs, terming the bill "inflationary."

The National Committee on Product Safety lists 122 models of color television sets as "extraordinary fire hazards."

Jan. 27—The White House police appear in new uniforms ordered by the President for ceremonial occasions.

Jan. 28—The House of Representatives fails to override the President's veto of the \$19.7-billion health, antipoverty and education appropriation bill; the vote is 226 to 191, 52 votes short of the $\frac{2}{3}$ majority needed to override the President's veto.

Jan. 29—The President names Under Secretary of the Interior Russell E. Train as chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality; Gordon MacDonald and Robert Cahn are also named to the council.

The *Washington Post* reports that the President's 1971 fiscal budget totals \$200.77 billion; estimated receipts total \$202.10 billion, projecting a surplus of \$1.33 billion. The *Post* has released the President's report prematurely.

Jan. 30—In his first Economic Report to Congress, President Nixon forecasts less inflation and less "real" growth in the economy in 1970, asking Congress for a "prudent" fiscal policy. In a subsequent televised news conference, he says he is confident that "the present rate of inflation will continue to decline."

Labor

Jan. 5—Joseph A. Yablonski, loser in an election for the presidency of the United Mine Workers in December, 1969, is found shot to death.

Jan. 7—Negotiations open between the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Trucking Employers, Inc., the bargaining arm of the nation's truckers. The union

asks a basic wage increase of 75 per cent plus other benefits over a 3-year period.

Jan. 8—Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz orders a full-scale investigation of the United Mine Workers election in which Yablonski was defeated.

Jan. 21—The Federal Bureau of Investigation announces that it has arrested 3 men in connection with the Yablonski murders.

Jan. 29—A federal mediator, J. Curtis Counts, reports that the General Electric Company and the striking electrical workers have reached an agreement in the 95-day-old strike. Terms of the settlement will be made public by the unions if they approve.

A series of talks between the nation's railroads and 4 unions break off.

Jan. 30—Two striking electrical unions accept the new agreement with the General Electric Company; 10 other unions have not yet accepted the contract.

Jan. 31—A U.S. district court issues a 10-day injunction to delay a nation-wide railroad strike.

Military

Jan. 5—The Defense Department announces that it will cut its civilian payroll by 5 per cent (76,700 employees) by June 30, 1971.

Jan. 7—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that, if the Soviet Union continues its strategic weapons build-up at the present rate, it might be able to destroy most of the U.S. Minuteman missiles even earlier than 1974.

Jan. 9—A report by the General Accounting Office says that a spot check of Army National Guard and Reserve units selected for high combat readiness shows that they lack both the training and equipment needed for rapid mobilization in the event of an emergency.

Jan. 15—At a news conference, Defense Secretary Laird says that as a result of reductions already made or planned in the next defense budget, about 1,250,000 Americans will lose their jobs; these will include military and civilian employees of

the defense establishment and defense workers directly affected by cutbacks in weapons purchases.

Jan. 16—The Air Force announces the grounding of all 10 C-5A supertransport planes after a crack is found in a wing of one of the planes.

Jan. 18—A spokesman for the Lockheed Georgia Company says that 8 of the 10 C-5A cargo planes have been cleared to fly again.

Jan. 19—The Air Force estimates that it will cost \$6.48 million to strengthen the C-5A against possible wing cracks. The additional cost of the first 58 of the 81 planes ordered by the Air Force will be borne by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Jan. 24—It is reported by *The New York Times* that the Army is training officers of foreign armies in chemical and biological warfare, despite the administration's decision to limit U.S. use of such weapons. In a speech in December, 1969, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D., Wis.) brought up the issue and revealed that since 1966 24 Thai military officers and 35 Arab military officers have been trained in chemical warfare.

Politics

Jan. 4—Senator Fred R. Harris (D., Oklahoma), Democratic national chairman, says that Democrats plan to use inflation as the major campaign issue in 1970.

Jan. 6—Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D., Conn.), who was censured by the Senate for diverting funds raised at political dinners to his personal use, announces his intention to seek a third term.

Supreme Court

Jan. 14—The Supreme Court rules that school districts in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas must desegregate by February 1, 1970.

Jan. 19—Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr., of Florida delivers a motion to the U.S. Supreme Court calling for a rehearing on its

order to desegregate schools by February 1.

The Court refuses to declare unconstitutional vaguely worded jury selection laws in Alabama and Georgia; although these laws (which require the selection of only "honest and intelligent" citizens) may have been used to keep blacks from jury duty, many states use similar laws without discriminating against blacks.

The Court rules that the Selective Service System may not speed the induction of young men who have turned in their draft cards in protest against the war in Vietnam.

President Nixon names Federal Judge G. Harrold Carswell of Florida to the Supreme Court.

Jan. 21—Carswell rejects the white supremacy principles he espoused in a speech he made in 1948 during his campaign for the Georgia legislature.

Jan. 22—Justice Department sources declare that the administration did not know that Carswell had ever made a "white supremacy" speech until the speech was discovered by a television news reporter in Florida.

Jan. 26—The Court rules, 6 to 2, that the Selective Service System has no legal authority to punish students by depriving them of their deferments because they have turned in their draft cards as a protest against the war. The Court also rules unanimously that a student who loses his draft deferment after he turns in his draft card as a protest may challenge his reclassification in court before he is inducted.

The Court refuses to hear a request from Florida's Governor Claude Kirk asking the Court to reconsider the order that 14 Southern school districts must desegregate by February 1.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

ZAMBIA

Jan. 29—President Kenneth Kaunda names himself chairman of a Mining and Industrial Development Corporation which will virtually take over the nation's mining, industry and commerce.

SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 175)

sea. This line will be built by a South African consortium and financed by the South African Industrial Development Corporation in the form of a loan to Malawi.

Considerable medical assistance has been given and offered both to Malawi and to the other neighboring states, and will shortly be coordinated by a committee representing government departments and the South African Medical Association.

The African leaders of South Africa's neighbors have made no secret of their repudiation of apartheid and their hostility to the domestic policies of their powerful patron, but they cannot afford to antagonize South Africa or refuse their cooperation. They are tied to the republic by the strongest of all political ties—national self-interest. And in her search for security and, to a lesser extent, in her economic development, South Africa is tied to them. They constitute a buffer against the harsher winds that blow further to the north and a guarantee that for the time being their frontiers constitute no danger to the Republic.

If South Africa's gains are modest, they are nonetheless significant. She has broken through the solid anti-South African front in Africa; she is no longer completely isolated; she is showing that she can and is prepared to establish formal relations with African governments; she has ceased to be defensive and has begun to move forward in her external relations. Prime Minister Vorster might say that "the principles and aims of our foreign policy remain unaltered, but the methods and the strategy depend on changed circumstances." Still most white South Africans are conscious that something has changed and—they hope—for the better.

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